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Is Litigation Counsel Who Also Engages in Competitive 
Decision-Making Wrong for the Part?* 
Abstract. In-house counsel wear different hats, and are often involved 
in business decisions regarding products, marketing, and other strategic 
issues.  It was in this context that courts began to adopt protective orders 
that precluded in-house counsel who provided their clients advice with 
“competitive decision-making” from having access to information from a 
competitor disclosed in discovery.  Prosecution bars present numerous 
issues for courts and counsel.  It may be that because of prosecution 
counsel’s knowledge of the technology that her service as trial counsel 
would lead to cost savings and other benefits to her client.  However, due 
to the myriad problems that arise from having litigation counsel also 
engage in other activities, she may be wrong for the part.  Only through 
careful analysis of the policies involved, and careful drafting of any 
protective orders can courts, clients, and counsel be sure of their casting 
decisions.   
Author. David Hricik is a national expert on law at the intersection of 
legal ethics and patent law. He has authored and co-authored the two 
treatises on the subjects of ethics in patent prosecution and litigation, led 
committees of national organizations, and served as an expert to lawyers 
and to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  In 2012–13, he clerked for 
the Honorable Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit.  
 
* The title is from the song “Wrong for the Part,” from the CD “Self-Titled” by Wesley Stace 
(Yep Roc 2013). 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
In an age of specialization, it will be the exception when outside counsel 
who serves as litigation counsel provides strategic product design advice to 
that client.  Trial lawyers ordinarily do not advise clients about product 
design, strategic business planning, or similar issues of competition.  Thus, 
ordinarily, a litigator who represents a client in litigation and other matters 
is not likely to be able to use information obtained during discovery from 
opposing parties to further his client’s business.  Other lawyers who will 
not represent the client in litigation represent that client in product 
decisions and the like. 
But in-house counsel often do wear these different hats, sometimes 
representing the client in myriad ways, and often also being involved in 
business decisions regarding products, marketing, and other strategic 
issues.  It was in this context that courts began to adopt protective orders 
that precluded in-house counsel who provided their clients “competitive 
decision-making” advice from having access to information from a 
competitor disclosed in discovery, which could be misused in those other 
roles.1 
 
1. See In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining 
the contexts in which protective orders are used); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 
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More recently, courts concluded that lawyers who prosecute patents can 
under some circumstances inadvertently misuse information obtained from 
an opposing party during discovery.2  While district courts often presumed 
virtually any involvement in any form of patent prosecution to be 
competitive decision-making, the Federal Circuit instead clarified that not 
all forms of patent prosecution allow for misuse of information.3  That 
decision adopted a fact-specific test and a burden-shifting approach to the 
issue.4  Despite adding some clarity, district courts have struggled with 
how to implement the Federal Circuit’s admonition that not all patent 
prosecution is competitive decision-making.5  They have also struggled 
with whether other forms of patent-related activities, such as 
reexamination and reissue, present the same risks as original prosecution, 
and whether representing a patentee in licensing or strategic portfolio 
management implicates the concerns that justify precluding access to 
confidential discovery information.6  The recent enactment of the America 
Invents Act (AIA),7 and in particular its new forms of post-grant 
challenges, raises new issues for the courts and lawyers. 
Of course, misuse of proprietary information is always a possibility; one 
that courts routinely deem is adequately addressed by a protective order 
restricting the use of information disclosed in discovery to the case in 
litigation.8  However, where the information is particularly sensitive and 
the lawyer is in a special position to misuse the information, even 
inadvertently, courts recognize that a simple prohibition against misuse of 
 
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the use of orders as a method to protect from disclosure of 
information). 
2.  See, e.g., Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378–79 (stating that courts have recognized that there 
can be inadvertent disclosures, even when being careful to preserve information); U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d 
at 1467–68 (addressing the possibilities of inadvertent disclosure from in-house counsel). 
3.  Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1379. 
4. Id. at 1380–81. 
5. Id. at 1378–79 (discussing what constitutes competitive decision-making); Intervet, Inc. v. 
Merial Ltd, 241 FRD 55, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2007) (analyzing various activities of the in-house counsel 
and concluding that the attorney was not a competitive decision-maker). 
6. See Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 531–32 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (evaluating 
whether to modify a protective order to allow in-house counsel access to confidential information); 
Edisync Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 12-CV-02231-MSK-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at 
*5–7, 2013 WL 561474, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2013) (discussing the issue of reexamination of 
activities in relation to the original prosecution bar). 
7. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (amending 35 
U.S.C. to provide patent reform). 
8. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378 (explaining that protective orders are used by courts to 
protect confidential information); Intel, 198 F.R.D. at 527–28 (stating that courts may use orders to 
help parties protect information). 
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the information is not enough.9  Instead, the opposing party may demand 
that the protective order provide that any person having access to highly 
confidential information be precluded from activities for clients where that 
information could, even inadvertently, be misused.10 
Effectively, the inclusion of a so-called “prosecution bar” in a protective 
order gives the patent-prosecuting lawyer and his litigation client a choice: 
the lawyer can elect to represent that client in activities that present the 
risk of misuse, but if he does so, he will not be allowed access to especially 
sensitive information in the litigation.  Thus, entry of a protective order 
denying access to critical information by those lawyers engaged in certain 
activities for their clients will effectively disqualify those lawyers from 
representing their clients in those other activities.11 
Balancing the interests of the lawyer, the opposing party, and the 
lawyer’s client requires careful analysis by counsel and the courts.  The 
courts must carefully determine whether and to what extent they bar 
litigators from access to discovery materials.  Imposing a bar too frequently 
will unnecessarily drive up litigation expenses and deprive a party of 
qualified, educated counsel; on the other hand, permitting unfettered 
access by a lawyer to his client’s competitor’s most current and important 
product development information could result in inadvertent or even 
intentional misuse of the information during certain other activities.12 
For these reasons, counsel must competently represent clients in 
obtaining or seeking to avoid prosecution bars.  However, counsel must be 
careful in seeking access where inadvertent disclosure and misuse are likely 
to occur, because that could result in liability for misappropriation of trade 
 
9. See U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 (making a point that, even with inadvertent disclosure of 
information sometimes being predictable, a protective order to protect certain information will not 
always adequately forestall the disclosure); Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. Suns Legacy Partners, 
LLC, No. CV-11-02304-PHX-NVW, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 172422, at *5–6, 2012 WL 6049746, 
at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2012) (“In order to protect against such inadvertent compromise, a court may  
issue a patent prosecution bar as part of a protection order.”). 
10. See, e.g., Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings PLC, No. C 02-02521-JF, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21400, at *5–7, 2002 WL 32831822, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2002) (seeking also 
to prevent lawyers from negotiating licenses in the field), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
11. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1379–80 (stating that a court must assess all relevant facts 
surrounding counsel’s activities in relation to prosecution in order to balance when attorneys will be 
exempted from prosecution laws); cf. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 (discussing circumstances in which 
denial of access to information by counsel can come about). 
12. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1380–81 (observing the interests and factors courts must assess 
in determining what level of protection is necessary to protect a client’s interest); U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d 
at 1468 (holding that forcing the plaintiff to rely on new counsel at a later stage of litigation “would 
create extreme and unnecessary hardship”). 
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secrets by the lawyer, his client, or both to the party that produced the 
information.13  A firm whose lawyers obtain confidential information 
during the discovery process from a non-client and whose lawyers 
represent that litigation client in closely related technology faces potential 
liability or allegations of unethical conduct for combining those roles.14  
Foremost, an opposing party that produced confidential information 
during discovery to such a firm can assert that firm lawyers then used the 
opposing party’s confidential information to benefit a firm client while 
prosecuting patents for him.  Likewise, a lawyer may receive proprietary 
information during discovery that he could use to benefit a client in 
licensing negotiation, strategic portfolio development, or other forms of 
business planning.  Finally, because participation by prosecution counsel in 
litigation may be in the client’s interests, but subject the lawyer to 
potential liability, the lawyer’s and client’s interests may conflict to a 
certain degree. 
After providing some background by discussing the development of 
competitive decision-making in the context of access by in-house counsel 
to discovery materials, this Article analyzes the cases’ application of the 
doctrine in the context of the litigator representing the litigation client in 
other matters involving patents.  It then provides guidance for lawyers to 
competently analyze the scope of prosecution bars and to confront any 
liability or ethical issues that such clients may raise. 
II.     DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMPETITIVE DECISION-
MAKING AND ITS EXTENSION FROM IN-HOUSE COUNSEL TO OUTSIDE 
LITIGATION COUNSEL 
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), a “court may, for 
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . 
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed 
only in a specified way . . . .”15  It has been common for federal district 
courts to enter a protective order that limits the use and disclosure of 
 
13. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378–79 (discussing when it is possible for inadvertent 
disclosure to occur); U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 (recognizing the risks of inadvertent disclosure). 
14. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1380 (offering an opinion on the difficult decisions 
attorneys face as new information comes to light during litigation); cf. Nazomi Commc'ns, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21400, at *5–6, 2002 WL 32831822, at *2 (analyzing the roles attorneys assume when 
prosecution bars are involved). 
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1), (c)(1)(G). 
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information exchanged during discovery.  Generally, a protective order 
prohibits use or disclosure of information beyond that necessary to 
prosecute the lawsuit.16  The general rule limiting information to use in 
the case is sufficient to protect against misuse of discovery information.17 
Under some circumstances, however, courts have found a general 
prohibition against misuse to be insufficient protection because of the risk 
of even inadvertent misuse of information by the recipient.18  The 
exception to the general rule—that a provision limiting use to the 
litigation is insufficient—developed in the context of determining whether 
in-house counsel for a party in litigation could have access to confidential 
discovery materials. 
Most of the time, of course, in-house counsel is in no real position to 
misuse information received from an opposing party.  A lawyer 
representing a corporation in a breach of contract over delivery of a 
defective widget that his client needed to run his factory, à la Hadley v. 
Baxendale,19 is unlikely to learn anything that he can use against the 
opponent, largely because his client is not a competitor with, but a 
customer of, the opposing party. 
However, courts have recognized that an in-house counsel who, in 
addition to representing his employer in the litigation, has responsibilities 
to his employer for product design, pricing, and similar competitive 
business activities should not have access to materials exchanged during 
discovery to the extent that the materials could be deliberately or 
 
16. See generally Wayne F. Reinke, Comment, Limiting the Scope of Discovery: The Use of 
Protective Orders and Document Retention Programs in Patent Litigation, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 175 
(1992) (describing a protective order, its uses and its procedural effects). 
17. See In re Dell Inc., 498 F. App’x 40, 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Deutsche Bank Trust 
Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (“Protective order provisions that disallow the use 
of designated confidential information beyond the scope of the litigation typically are sufficient to 
ensure protection of sensitive business information.”); see also Edisync Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 
No. 12-CV-02231-MSK-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at *7–9, 2013 WL 561474, at *2–3 
(D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2013) (holding that although the party did not justify the bar, the court included 
a general provision limiting the use of information to the litigation); Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC 
v. Suns Legacy Partners, LLC, No. CV-11-02304-PHX-NVW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172422, at 
*12–13, 2012 WL 6049746, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2012) (denying a broad prosecution bar, but 
granting a modification to the protective order to preclude the use of confidential information 
disclosed by the parties in future litigation before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). 
18. See Dell, 498 Fed. App’x at 42 (citing multiple cases recognizing limited circumstances 
when a general prohibition against misuse is sufficient); Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1380 (discussing 
the split of authority regarding whether attorneys may be barred from sensitive discovery pertinent to 
the patents they are prosecuting). 
19. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854). 
4 HRICIK_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:08 AM 
2014] Litigation Counsel Who Also Engages in Competitive Decision-Making 157 
inadvertently used in business-related activities.20  A majority of courts 
hold that in-house counsel who are engaged in such competitive decision-
making can be denied access to certain sensitive discovery.21 
While the doctrine developed and seems well established in the context 
of in-house counsel receiving discovery materials, the scope of what 
constitutes competitive decision-making by in-house counsel remains 
unclear, particularly at the margins.  For example, a court has held that the 
head of one corporation’s intellectual property (IP) department was not 
engaged in competitive decision-making.22  Thus, although it is settled 
that in-house counsel who engage in competitive decision-making can be 
denied access to certain information, the contours of the definition of 
 
20. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1467–68 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see Frank 
Brunckhorst Co. v. Ihm, No. 11-1883 CAB (NLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28152, at *4, *17, 2012 
WL 684760 at *2, *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (discussing counsel for a small corporation); Barnes 
and Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C 11–02709 EMC (LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23103, at *17, 
2012 WL 601806, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2012) (analyzing in-house patent prosecution and 
licensing counsel); Infosint S.A. v. H. Lundbeck A.S., No. 06CIV2869LAKRLE, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36678, at *18–19, 2007 WL 1467784, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (determining whether 
in-house counsel engaged in competitive decision-making); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 
04-901-JJF, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15482, at *6–8, 2005 WL 1801683, at *2 (D. Del. July 28, 2005) 
(barring certain in-house lawyers from access); Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 531–
32 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (barring access); Volvo Penta of the Ams, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 187 F.R.D. 
240, 242–44 (E.D. Va. 1999) (granting access); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., No. CIV. A. 
MDL-1021, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4698, at *6–7, 1995 WL 151739, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 1995) 
(allowing counsel access to discovery material); News Am. v. Marquis, No. CV 000177440S, 2000 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1273, at *1–2, 2000 WL 726821, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 3, 2000) 
(giving in-house counsel permission to view discovery materials). 
21. See Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. CIV S-08-2632 FCDGGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24637, at *13–14, 2010 WL 728454, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010) (holding that in-house 
counsel engaged in competitive decision-making); Braun Corp. v. Vantage Mobility Int’l, LLC, 265 
F.R.D. 330, 333 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 2009) (“The sole question is whether there is an unacceptable risk 
of or opportunity for ‘inadvertent disclosure’ of confidential information . . . .  Involvement of the 
attorney in ‘competitive decision-making’ is one basis for limiting access to information.” (quoting 
Autotech Techs. Ltd. v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 405, 408 (N.D. Ill. 2006))).  See 
generally Louis S. Sorrell, In-House Counsel Access to Confidential Information Produced During 
Discovery in Intellectual Property Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 657, 657 (1994) (“This article 
summarizes the current case law relating to in-house counsel access to confidential information 
produced during discovery in intellectual property litigation.”). 
22. Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 241 F.R.D. 55, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2007); see also F.T.C. v. 
Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 07-1021 (PLF), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53567, at *9–10, 2007 WL 
2059741, at *3 (D.D.C. July 6, 2007) (imposing a $250,000 penalty for violation of protective order 
as additional penalty to protect against misuse of confidences, despite being unable to find in-house 
counsel was a “competitive decision-maker”); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Quark, Inc., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 424, at *1–2, 2007 WL 61885, at *1–2 (D. Del. Jan. 4, 2007) (analyzing which in-
house counsel were competitive decision-makers). 
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competitive decision-making are not clear even in the setting in which the 
courts originally developed the doctrine.23 
Many years ago, the competitive decision-making doctrine leapt from 
the context of in-house lawyers who mixed representation with business to 
the context of outside counsel who litigated and who also prosecuted 
patents.24  As next shown, district courts at first generally found that a 
litigator who also engaged in any kind of patent prosecution was ipso facto 
engaged in competitive decision-making, and thus subject to a bar in the 
protective order. 
It makes sense for this doctrine to have jumped to the context of outside 
counsel who combine representations in patent prosecution with litigation 
representations.  This is because the exchange of highly confidential 
information that often relates to product design, implementation, or 
marketing is inherent in patent litigation.  In fact, courts regularly 
acknowledge that confidential information is going to be exchanged in 
most patent infringement lawsuits, even when this information will be of 
critical commercial importance.25  Sensitive commercial information is 
 
23. The U.S. Federal Circuit defined competitive decision-making as: “[S]horthand for a 
counsel's activities, association, and relationship with a client that are such as to involve counsel's 
advice and participation in any or all of the client's decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made in 
light of similar or corresponding information about a competitor.”  U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 n.3.  
Subsequent decisions have questioned this definition and muddied the waters of what exactly 
constitutes competitive decision-making.  See Deustche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1379 (“While there is 
general agreement that the competitive decisionmaking test articulated in U.S. Steel is the correct 
standard, the district courts have developed divergent views on whether and to what extent patent 
prosecution activities entail competitive decisionmaking.”); see also Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory, 
Ltd., No. 02 C 7008, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23653, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 2003) (“Plainly, the 
U.S. Steel court's listing of client decisions was not limited to ‘pricing and product design.’  The 
court's use of ‘etc.’ reveals that those are only examples of the kinds of client decisions that may be 
made ‘in light of similar or corresponding information about a competitor.’”). 
24. See Andrx Pharm., LLC v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 236 F.R.D. 583, 587 (relying on 
similar notions to preclude adding outside counsel, who prosecuted patents, to the protective order), 
aff'd, No. 05-23264CV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58254, 2006 WL 2403942 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 
2006); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 04-901-JJF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15482, at *6, 2005 
WL 1801683, at *2 (D. Del. July 28, 2005) (“The question of whether to allow in-house counsel 
access to materials under a protective order is governed by the factual circumstances surrounding each 
individual counsel’s activities, association and relationship with a party, and not the attorney’s status 
as in-house or outside counsel.”). 
25. Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 03-484-KAJ, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12782, at *6, 2004 WL 1196965, at *2 (D. Del. May 25, 2004) (recognizing the 
potential for abuse and competitive loss where confidential scientific information is likely to be 
disclosed during discovery); see, e.g., Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control Inc., 
682 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Del. 1988) (reviewing precedent recognizing the need for proper safeguards 
against disclosure of trade secrets). 
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almost always subject to discovery in patent cases.26  Thus, there is no 
doubt that often the information exchanged could be inadvertently 
misused if the lawyer is in position, by reason of prosecuting patents, to 
shape product design and other forms of competitive decision-making. 
A seeming majority of the cases adopted a relatively bright line that any 
form of patent prosecution was competitive decision-making,27 although, 
as next shown, there was a split.28 
A. Decisions Regarding Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical 
Corp.29 
 
26. See David Hricik, How Things Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and Liability Risks 
Arising from Representing a Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 421, 441–42 n.119 (2005) (“In virtually every patent case, the parties will have trade secret, 
confidential or proprietary technical, business and marketing information and documents that they 
do not want to show to the other side, especially if the other side is a direct competitor.” (quoting 
John M. Benassi & Colbern C. Stuart III, PATENT LITIGATION §4:12.3 (2003))). 
27. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., No. 93-488-LON, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20714, at *13, 1994 WL 16189689, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1994) (rejecting attorneys’ 
arguments that, while “theoretically possible for them to abuse the confidential information received, 
. . . they understand their ethical duty and will act in conformance with it,” and entering an 
injunction against prosecuting related applications until one year after the suit has ended), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 121 F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 478 F. 
Supp. 1191, 1195 (D. Del. 1979) (“Weighing heavily against disclosure [of abandoned patent 
applications] is the fact that Tyco’s counsel in this litigation is also actively engaged in the 
prosecution of other Tyco applications embracing the same subject matter . . . in the Patent and 
Trademark Office.”); see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. UCB SA, No. 95 C 6351, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16070, at *5, 1996 WL 633986, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1996) (allowing discovery of 
abandoned applications, and noting that “there has been no showing that counsel of record for UCB 
[the party seeking access to the abandoned applications] routinely advises UCB regarding patent 
matters or otherwise serves as UCB’s chief patent counsel.  In other words, there has been no 
adequate demonstration that disclosure to counsel is effectively disclosure to UCB.”); In re Certain 
Magnetic Switches for Coaxial Transmission Lines & Products Containing Same, Order No. 4, No. 
337-TA-346, 1993 ITC LEXIS 143, at *4, 1993 WL 852560, at *2 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Mar. 2, 
1993) (“[I]t is not required that counsel cease involvement in patent prosecutions, even in areas of 
related subject matter, in order to gain access to confidential business information.”); In re Certain 
Amorphous Metal Alloys & Amorphous Particles, Inv. No. 337-TA-143, 1983 ITC LEXIS 213, at 
*9 (Int’l Trade Comm’n July 22, 1983) (refusing to preclude counsel from having access to 
information unless he agreed not to prosecute patents in related areas). 
28. In re Pabst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litig., No. MDL 1278, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6374, at *8–11, 2000 WL 554219, at *3–4 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (reviewing multiple district court 
decisions holding that competitive decision-making includes “advice and participation in prosecuting 
patent applications” related to the patents at issue).  But see U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 (requiring 
presentation of “factual circumstances surrounding each individual counsel’s activities”). 
29. Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., No. 96-1231-IEG (POR), 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24130 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 1997).  Sibia is not the only decision by the Federal Circuit 
relevant to this discussion.  That same year, the Federal Circuit addressed a similar question, and, as 
in Sibia, issued an unpublished and thus non-precedential decision.  In re Voith Sulzer Paper Tech. 
of Heidenheim Ger., No. 506, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12854, at *4–5, 1997 WL 264842, at *2 
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Surprisingly, despite the split, when the issue was squarely before the 
Federal Circuit, it decided the issue, but in a nonprecedential disposition. 
In an unpublished 1997 decision, Sibia Neurosciences, Inc., the prosecuting 
litigator had been prosecuting patents in the field of cell surface receptors 
and related proteins and assay methods for his client, Cadus, for two years 
before Sibia filed an infringement suit against Cadus.30  The suit involved 
that same technology, which was described as being “kind of the everyday 
stuff of biotechnology assays.”31  As a result, the opposing party sought a 
protective order that would have barred the lawyer from prosecuting 
patents in that field if he had access to certain information during the 
suit.32  The lawyer stated at the hearing on entry of the protective order 
that he did not provide advice on inventions:  
[Inventions] are made . . . by inventors.  We [attorneys] basically receive 
information from inventors and we make sure that that information is 
protected to . . . the [full] scope of the law as best we can, so our work goes 
into basically making sure that the invention once made is properly 
protected by patent.33  
The lawyer further testified that he was not generally aware of marketing 
information, nor was he involved in product development or pricing 
information, but instead simply protected, through patenting, inventions 
disclosed to him by the client.34  Significantly, he also testified that he had 
more than fifty biotechnology clients, “many of which were involved in the 
field of cell surface proteins and receptors.”35  In this vein, he stated that 
he had “a lot of confidential trade secret information” from each client, 
and yet he kept the information compartmentalized and distinct.36 
Based on these facts, the magistrate entered a protective order 
precluding anyone with access to certain information from prosecuting 
patents “in the area of cell surface receptors and assay methods relating to 
the same” until one year after any appeals in the case were resolved.37  
However, the district court reversed the magistrate judge’s decision.38  In 
 
(Fed. Cir. May 6, 1997) (refusing to grant the petition for mandamus to have the trial court enter an 
order requiring that lawyers who obtained certain documents refrain from prosecuting patents). 
30. Sibia Neurosciences, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24130, at *11–12. 
31. Id. at *12. 
32. Id. at *1–2. 
33. Id. at *11. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at *11–12. 
37. Id. at *3. 
38. Id. at *21 (holding the entry of the bar was “clearly erroneous and contrary to law”). 
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doing so, it noted that the lawyer had no involvement in pricing or similar 
business-related activities that had been found to constitute competitive 
decision-making.39  Then the district court turned to the argument that a 
ban was justified due to “the unique role which patent attorneys play in a 
client’s competitive patenting decisions.”40  The district court rejected that 
proposition:  
[It would create a] per se rule that counsel who prosecute patents in a 
particular field should always be subject to disqualification by protective 
order from viewing confidential information produced in infringement or 
enforcement litigation concerning patents in that field.  Under this rule, a 
patent holder or patent applicant would be precluded as a practical matter 
from retaining its outside patent counsel to defend it in an infringement 
action, . . . or to prosecute an enforcement action on its behalf.41  
Instead, the district court credited the attorney’s testimony that he could 
“segregate this information” in his mind, and held that the magistrate 
“erred in finding that [the attorney’s] involvement in the prosecution of 
patents for Cadus, by itself, demonstrated the existence of a risk of 
inadvertent disclosure.”42 
Sibia then sought mandamus from the Federal Circuit, which denied 
the petition in an unpublished opinion.43  In refusing to grant the writ of 
mandamus, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected the argument that 
involvement in patent prosecution was, by itself, sufficient to justify a bar, 
stating: “denying access to Cadus’s outside counsel on the ground that they 
also prosecute patents for Cadus is the type of generalization counseled 
against in U.S. Steel.  The facts, not the category, must inform the 
result.”44  Thus, the Sibia court clearly held that patent prosecution by 
itself does not require denial of access to information—it does not mean 
 
39. See Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., No. 96-1231-IEG (POR), 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24130, at *21–22 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 1997) (noting that he did not serve on the board 
of his client; did not share employees with it; had no involvement in pricing, design, or similar 
activities; and generally had “a typical outside counsel relationship”). 
40. Id. at *23 (internal quotations omitted). 
41. Id. at *24. 
42. Id. at *25.  The court went on to distinguish the only prior case that held to the contrary, 
Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., No. 93-488-LON, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20714, 1994 
WL 16189689 (D. Del. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 121 F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  Id. at 
*18–20.  It concluded by holding that even if the attorney was involved in competitive decision-
making, “Cadus will suffer a serious and unnecessary hardship from the disqualification of . . . its 
patent counsel for more than a year before SIBIA commenced this litigation.”  Id. at *26. 
43. In re Sibia Neurosciences, Inc., No. 525, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 31828, at *9, 1997 WL 
688174, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 1997). 
44. Id. at *7, 1997 WL 688174, at *3. 
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the prosecuting attorney is a competitive decision-maker.  The Federal 
Circuit denied the petition for mandamus because, while the “magistrate 
judge found that [the attorney] was very involved in the prosecution of 
patents, . . . [he] did not make any findings regarding outside counsel’s 
involvement in ‘competitive decisionmaking,’ such as involvement in 
pricing or product design.”45  The court upheld on mandamus the district 
court’s denial of entry of a protective order with a bar because “none of the 
indicia of ‘competitive decisionmaking’ was present . . . .”46 
B. Decisions After Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. 
After Sibia, the courts continued to split.  Some courts held prosecution 
to constitute competitive decision-making;47 others reached the opposite 
conclusion and, in doing so, sometimes cited Sibia despite its lack of 
precedential weight.48 
 
45. Id. at *8, 1997 WL 688174, at *3. 
46. Id.  The court emphasized that “the standard is not ‘regular contact’ with other corporate 
officials who make ‘policy,’ or even competitive decisions, but ‘advice and participation’ in 
‘competitive decisionmaking.’”  Id. at *8–9, 1997 WL 688174, at *3 (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
47. See, e.g., Chan v. Intuit, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 659, 662 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (entering protective 
order which precluded access to certain discoverable information by those engaged in patent 
prosecution, and holding that “advice on the scope of patent claims must also be defined as 
competitive decision-making”); Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02 C 7008, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23653, at *26–27, (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 2003) (“[T]he party could choose not to disclose 
confidential information to patent prosecution counsel, in which case that counsel could continue to 
prosecute patent applications; or, the party could choose to reveal confidential information to patent 
prosecution counsel, and accept limitations on the attorney’s ability to prosecute certain patent 
applications for a period of time.”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), 
No. 00-2503 (MJD/JGL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22805, at *12, 2001 WL 34784493, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Dec. 19, 2001), (“[P]rosecuting patents is distinct from other legal duties and presents unique 
opportunities for inadvertent disclosure”), aff'd, No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1758, 2002 WL 171711 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2002); In re Papst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litig., No. 
MDL 1298, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, at *5, 2000 WL 554219, at *4 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) 
(enjoining prosecution of patents related to patent-in-suit); SRU Biosystems, Inc. v. Hobbs, No. 04-
5628 BLS, 2005 Mass. Super. Lexis 361, at *3–4, 2005 WL 2010339, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug 2, 
2005) (holding involvement in prosecution required bar); see also Promega Corp. v. Applera Corp., 
No. 01-C-244-C, 2002 WL 32359938, at *8–9 (W.D. Wis. June 7, 2002) (discussing prosecution 
bars applicable to both in-house counsel and expert witnesses contained in a protective order); 
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Sanyo N. Am. Corp., No. C.A. 00-018-GMS, 2001 WL 194303, 
at *1 n. 5 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2001) (noting disagreement among parties as to scope of prosecution bar 
in protective order); Davis v. AT&T Corp., No. 98-CV-0189S(H), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20417, 
at *6–8, 1998 WL 912012, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998) (discussing disclosure to the plaintiff 
who was also an inventor). 
48. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elec., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 574, 579–80 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007) (denying the entry of a motion for protective order); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Espeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19429, at *2 2004 WL 2534389, at *1 (N.D. 
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Finally in 2010, nearly fifteen years after its unpublished decision in In 
re Sibia decided the question, the Federal Circuit made it official in its 
precedential opinion in In re Deutsche Bank49: the fact that a lawyer 
“prosecuted patents” did not, by itself, mean the lawyer was engaged in 
competitive decision-making.50  The court recognized that “patent 
prosecution” was shorthand for a spectrum of involvement in a client’s 
business affairs that a particular patent practitioner might have, only some 
of which implicated the concerns underlying competitive decision-making 
and, therefore, requiring a bar.51  The court also created an analytical and 
procedural framework for deciding whether and when bars were 
appropriate.52  This Article turns there next. 
III.     THE CONFUSING DEUTSCHE BANK PROCESS FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER TO IMPOSE A PROSECUTION BAR IN A PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Applying Deutsche Bank requires a four-step, multi-factored approach in 
which the first three steps are inter-related.  The first step requires the 
party seeking the bar to produce evidence that proves that the information 
it will disclose in discovery could be put to misuse by assuming that 
opposing counsel is engaged in competitive decision-making.  If that 
showing is made, then opposing counsel bears the burden of production, 
on a counsel-by-counsel basis, that a lawyer is in fact not engaged in 
competitive decision-making.  If the party opposing the entry of the bar 
fails to establish an exemption, the party seeking the bar must still show 
there is a reasonable relationship between the information and the 
activities of those lawyers.  In this step, the court evaluates information 
produced by the party and determines whether the party seeking the bar 
 
Ill. Sept. 24, 2004) (refusing to enter a protective order that would deny outside litigation counsel 
access to certain materials because he was not involved in “pricing, marketing, product design or the 
like”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775 (D. Md. 2003) (refusing to 
enter a protective order that would deny outside counsel access to confidential information despite 
the fact that he prosecuted patents for his client because there was no indicia he was a competitive 
decision-maker); Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings PLC, No. C 02-02521-JF, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21400, at *11, 2002 WL 32831822, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2002) (denying 
defendants’ motion for an interim protective order), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Interactive Coupon Mktg. Group, Inc. v. H.O.T.! Coupons, LLC, No. 98 C 7408, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12437, at *8, 1999 WL 618969, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1999) (“The court is not 
persuaded that it is appropriate to disqualify patent prosecution counsel from an active role in its 
client’s litigation as a matter of course.”). 
49. In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
50. Id. at 1377–78. 
51. Id. at 1378–80. 
52. Id. at 1381. 
4 HRICIK_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:08 AM 
164 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:150 
has shown good cause for the bar sought, both whether to include one at 
all, and whether the scope sought is warranted in terms of its length and 
the activities precluded.  In the final step, even if the court finds there is 
good cause for bar sought and that a particular lawyer engaged in 
competitive decision-making, the party opposing the bar can nonetheless 
show that the benefit of the bar is outweighed by the prejudice it causes.  
In that final step, the burden of production and persuasion is on the party 
opposing the bar. 
Although this approach makes practical and procedural sense, the 
language of Deutsche Bank does not clearly adopt it.  As a result, the 
district courts have disagreed on how this process operates.  Because of the 
lack of clarity in Deutsche Bank and subsequent judicial confusion, this 
Article now analyzes these steps more closely before analyzing the issues 
and interests that courts and counsel must consider in determining 
whether to apply a bar and, if so, to what extent to apply it. 
A. Step One: Is the Information Such that a Competitive Decision-Maker 
 Reasonably Would Inadvertently Misuse It? 
In the first step, Deutsche Bank makes clear that the party seeking the 
bar must establish that the information likely to be disclosed is of such a 
confidential or proprietary nature that it is not sufficient to simply include 
a general bar in the protective order limiting use of the information to the 
litigation—and do so by assuming that opposing counsel is engaged in 
competitive decision-making.53  Thus, a predicate for imposition of a bar is 
that the party seeking the bar will likely disclose information during 
discovery of sufficient commercial import and secrecy to warrant more 
than the general prohibition against use of information beyond the scope 
of the litigation.54  Obviously, the party seeking the bar necessarily has the 
burden to establish that it likely would disclose that sort of information 
because not only does it have the burden under Rule 26, but also, by 
definition, its opponent does not possess the information at issue.55 
 
53. Id. at 1381. 
54. See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. Suns Legacy Partners, LLC, No. CV-11-02304-
PHX-NVW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172422, at *11–12, 2012 WL 6049746, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 
2012) (concluding that “vague and speculative” assertions are not sufficient); AmTab Mfg. Corp. v. 
SICO Inc., No. 11 C 2692, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7307, at *5, 2012 WL 195027, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 19, 2012) (characterizing SICO’s arguments as vague and speculative, and establishing that 
SICO failed to identify a “clearly defined and serious injury.”). 
55. FED. R. CIV. P. (26)(c) (explaining the duties of the party seeking a bar in regard to the 
burden of proof relative to the potential risk of misuse of sensitive information); see also NeXedge 
LLC v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“At this early stage, 
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The Federal Circuit has emphasized that not all sensitive information is 
of the kind that can be misused during prosecution: “[F]inancial data and 
other sensitive business information . . . would not normally be relevant to 
a patent application and thus would not normally be expected to trigger a 
patent prosecution bar.”56  Courts have reasoned that information in a 
patent or published application is “ordinarily regarded as public,” and so 
its disclosure does not implicate the need for a bar.57  However, 
“information related to new inventions and technology under 
development, especially those that are not already the subject of pending 
patent applications, may pose a heightened risk of inadvertent disclosure” 
by counsel engaged in competitive decision-making in patent 
prosecution.58  Further, information regarding improvements to a 
published application or patent may be protected.59 
Although the court did not characterize the ultimate purpose of this 
inquiry, such inquiry seems to turn on whether the information would 
create a substantial risk of injury to the disclosing party that is not resolved 
by the inclusion of a “no use beyond litigation” bar due to the nature of 
the information.60  This determination is obviously a very fact-driven 
investigation and analysis.  For example, if the information relates to 
products that could be reverse-engineered, this would suggest that a 
prosecution bar is more likely to be inappropriate.61  Similarly, if the 
information is stale or quickly will become so, then a bar is less likely to be 
warranted.62  A careful examination of the market, the parties, and the 
technology is required.63 
 
however, it is unlikely that the proponent of a prosecution bar could have sufficient information 
about opposing counsel’s involvement in competitive decision-making to make the threshold 
showing that NeXedge requires.”). 
56. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381. 
57. Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 725, 731 (Fed. Cl. 2013) (quoting 
On-Line Techs, Inc. v. Bodenswerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
58. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381. 
59. Id. 
60. In the protective order under review in Deutsche Bank, the producing party could prevent a 
person engaged in competitive decision-making from reviewing information only if it had a good 
faith basis to label the information as “creat[ing] a substantial risk to the disclosing party.”  Id. at 
1376. 
61. As explained above, the court in Deutsche Bank held that Federal Circuit law applies to this 
issue.  Id. at 1378. 
62. The court in Papst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litigation held that the only information which 
could be kept from the prosecuting litigator was “information that embodies product design.” In re 
Papst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litig., No. MDL 1298, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, at *14, 2000 
WL 554219, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000).  In some circumstances, for example where the litigator is 
tasked by the client in drafting claims to cover competitor's products, the scope of protection 
recognized by the Papst court may be too narrow.  Id.  The Federal Circuit has held that there is 
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B. Step Two: Is the Intended Recipient of the Information in Fact a 
 Competitive Decision-Maker? 
If the party seeking the bar shows that the production of evidence that 
likely would be misused by a competitive decision-maker, the Deutsche 
Bank court stated that the burden then shifts to the party opposing the bar 
to establish, on a counsel-by-counsel basis, an “exemption” on one of two 
grounds: either that the lawyer’s patent prosecution work “does not and is 
not likely to implicate competitive decision-making related to the subject 
matter of the litigation so as to give rise to a risk of inadvertent use”64 of 
the confidential information disclosed during litigation; or that “the 
potential injury to the moving party from restriction on its choice of 
litigation and prosecution counsel outweighs the potential injury to the 
opposing party caused by such inadvertent use.”65 
In two respects, this does not fit the usual procedural approach.  While 
placing the burden of production on the party to show that a lawyer does 
not in fact engage in competitive decision-making makes practical sense, 
shifting the burden of proof to that party does not conform with the rule, 
because the rule imposes the burden to show good cause on the party 
seeking the protective order.66  Second, it does not make sense for the 
court to examine whether the prejudice outweighs the benefit until it 
decides that there is good cause for the bar.  Only then should the court 
impose a burden of production and persuasion on the party opposing the 
bar to establish that, despite the existence of good cause, the cost of the bar 
outweighs its benefits. 
Because of these issues, the district courts have continued to disagree on 
the process and burdens of proof required by Deutsche Bank, and they have 
at times also misapprehended the case completely.67  For example, while it 
 
nothing per se improper about drafting claims of a pending application to cover a competitor's 
product, but using nonpublic information obtained through discovery to do so presents a different 
question.  Lisa Dolak, The Ethics of Delaying Prosecution, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 739, 753, n.82 (2004). 
63. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381 (holding that when considering a prosecution bar, a 
court must weigh all relevant factors for both parties and balance the parties’ interest against the 
potential risks); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(requiring a thorough analysis into counsel’s “activities, association, and relationship with a client” in 
order to accurately determine if counsel is involved in competitive decision-making). 
64. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381. 
65. Id. 
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
67. Compare Iconfind, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 110319 (GEB/JFM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88010, at *8, 2011 WL 3501348, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9. 2011) (imposing the burden of showing 
“a risk of inadvertent disclosure” on the movant), with Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2180 (SBA/DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *7, 2011 WL 
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does not seem practical or pragmatic for the party asserting the need for a 
bar to come forward with evidence as to the nature of representation being 
afforded by opposing counsel to his client, and Deutsche Bank makes clear 
that the burden to show that counsel is not engaged in competitive 
decision-making is on the party opposing the bar, some courts have 
required the moving party to produce evidence of what opposing counsel 
does for his client.68  This makes little sense.  While the initial burden of 
showing good cause rests upon the movant, once general involvement in 
prosecution-related activities is shown, the burden of production ought to 
shift to the party opposing the bar to fully and fairly disclose the role of 
litigation counsel in those areas.69  Conversely, however, it seems odd to 
analyze whether the prejudice of a bar outweighs its benefits before 
determining whether good cause for a bar exists in the first place. 
For these reasons, a court should effectively assume in the first step that 
the recipient lawyer is a competitive decision-maker.  This seems implied 
by the language of Deutsche Bank and is also necessary from a practical 
perspective.  Specifically, the court stated that the party seeking the bar 
must show that the information is at risk of misuse by a lawyer engaged in 
competitive decision-making;70 further, as a practical matter, the 
producing party will normally have no way to know what its opposing 
 
197811, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (“Under Deutsche Bank, which represents the controlling 
law in this dispute, Defendants, as the moving party, bear the burden of showing as a threshold 
matter that the proposed prosecution bar ‘reasonably reflect[s] the risk presented by the disclosure of 
proprietary competitive information.’” (citing In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 605 F.3d 1373, 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 2010))).  For a court’s interpretation of the split, see Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 254, 255–56 (D.P.R. 2012)  The Eon Corp. court stated: 
“The conflict between these two lines of cases is a significant one, concerning, as it does, the movant's 
burden at the threshold stage: is it necessary that it show, on a counsel-by-counsel basis, that the 
opposing counsel engage in competitive decisionmaking?, or is it enough that it show that a general 
bar would be reasonable in this particular case, shifting the burden to opposing counsel to seek 
exemptions? For several reasons, we think the Applied Signal approach is superior.” Id.   
68. See Clayton Corp. v. Momentive Performance, Materials, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-1349 AGF, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68239, at *13, 2013 WL 2099437, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2013) 
(“Defendants have not provided the Court with an affidavit . . . .  As a result, the Court has no 
evidentiary basis upon which to determine what relations Plaintiff’s attorneys have with their client, 
what the scope of the representation of plaintiff is, who they advise or consult within the company, or 
any other ground by which the Court could gauge the risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential 
information.”). 
69. See Eon Corp., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56 (engaging in extended analysis of the burdens, 
and reaching this conclusion); In re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., MDL No. 2354, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 157352, at *19, 2012 WL 5398858, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2012) (“Once [the] moving 
party establishes the need for a prosecution bar, and that the proposed bar is reasonable, the burden 
shifts to the party seeking an exemption from a patent prosecution bar . . . .”). 
70. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1380. 
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party’s lawyers do for it in any specific way, beyond the fact that, if it is 
public information, the lawyers prosecute patents. 
Some district courts, however, have held that the party seeking the bar 
must come forward with evidence to show that opposing counsel, or some 
other participant in the litigation, is engaged in competitive decision-
making.71  This approach is contrary to the language of Deutsche Bank and 
is wholly impractical: how in the typical case can the proponent of the bar 
know enough about the activities of opposing counsel, his experts, or 
others to show that a particular lawyer or person is engaged in competitive 
decision-making?72  The burden is not on the proponent to prove up 
activities of opposing counsel. 
The Deutsche Bank court recognized that not all patent prosecution 
involves competitive decision-making; instead, there is a spectrum.73  On 
one end of the spectrum are patent prosecutors who are clearly involved in 
what can fairly be said to create the risk of misuse of information:  
Such involvement may include obtaining disclosure materials for new 
inventions and inventions under development, investigating prior art relating 
to those inventions, making strategic decisions on the type and scope of 
patent protection that might be available or worth pursuing for such 
inventions, writing, reviewing, or approving new applications or 
continuations-in-part of applications to cover those inventions, or 
strategically amending or surrendering claim scope during prosecution.74  
On this end of the spectrum, “[t]he risk of inadvertent disclosure of 
competitive information learned during litigation is . . . much greater.”75 
On the other end of the spectrum, “[s]ome attorneys involved in patent 
litigation . . . may have patent prosecution duties that involve little more 
than reporting office actions or filing ancillary paper work . . . .”76  
Alternatively, “some attorneys may be involved in high-altitude oversight 
of patent prosecution, such as staffing projects or coordinating client 
meetings, but have no significant role in crafting the content of patent 
 
71. See, e.g., Eon Corp., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (“Thus, the counsel-specific balancing is done 
only after a court has decided that a prosecution bar is called for, and it must be initiated by the party 
seeking the exemption.”). 
72. See id. at 255–56 (noting the differences in the types of reasoning as to who has the burden 
of proving competitive decision-making). 
73. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1379–80 (“Because patent prosecution is not a one-
dimensional endeavor and can encompass a range of activities, it is shortsighted to conclude that 
every patent prosecution attorney is necessarily involved in competitive decisionmaking.”). 
74. Id. at 1380. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1379. 
4 HRICIK_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:08 AM 
2014] Litigation Counsel Who Also Engages in Competitive Decision-Making 169 
applications or advising clients on the direction to take their portfolios.”77  
As to attorneys on this end of the spectrum, “[t]here is little risk that 
attorneys involved solely in these kinds of prosecution activities will 
inadvertently rely on or be influenced by information they may learn as 
trial counsel during the course of litigation.”78 
In the middle, of course, lie the difficult fact patterns that might create a 
close question as to whether a prosecution bar is justified.  In this middle 
ground, the court noted that factors include whether the person took 
instructions from senior attorneys, or instead acted on his own in shaping 
an application.79  The court emphasized that even if the activities did not 
indicate a heightened risk, “the risk of inadvertent disclosure may 
nonetheless arise under the facts and circumstances of a particular case 
. . . .”80 
Thus, as with many issues in the Federal Circuit, the totality of the 
circumstances matters.81  To mitigate the risk of misuse, in-house counsel 
should handle substantive prosecution, leaving outside counsel subject to 
the prosecution bar.82  Another issue is whether a lawyer’s participation in 
reexamination or reissue proceedings, intellectual property rights (IPR), 
patent acquisition, or licensing and related activities constitute competitive 
decision-making.83 
 
77. Id. at 1379–80. 
78. Id. at 1380. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognizing the 
Circuit’s evaluation of “willfulness and its duty of due care under the totality of the circumstances”); 
Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that before 
considering the “exculpatory value of an opinion of counsel, the legal advice contained therein must 
be found on the totality of the circumstances to be competent such that the client was reasonable in 
relying upon it”). 
82. Obviously, where all outside counsel does is file a completed application, including claims, 
outside counsel cannot misuse information in drafting the application.  David Hricik, Ethics in 
Today’s Patent Practice for Washington Practitioners, Washington State Patent Lawyer Association, 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, at 57 (Mar. 2012), available at http://wspla.org/ 
wspla_04.28.12CLE.pdf. 
83. Cf. Crystal Image Tech., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., No. CIV A 08-307, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32972, at *3, 2009 WL 1035017, at *1–3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2009) (“A reexamination 
of a patent before the [PTO] is a continuation of the pre-issuance prosecution of the patent.”), 
construed by 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48158, 2010 WL 1979298 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48290, 2010 WL 1978760 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 
2010); Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension Semiconductor, Inc., No. 08-158-P-H, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37445, at *24–30, 2009 WL 1210638, at *9–10 (D. Me. Apr. 30, 2009) 
(considering licensing and other activities including negotiation in relation to the balancing test). 
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Accordingly, in assessing whether the party moving for a protective 
order has established good cause, a court should consider each counsel’s 
actual preparation and prosecution activities, and do so on a counsel-by-
counsel basis taking into account not only the nature of the activities but 
the proximity of the subject matter of the lawyer’s work to the technology 
involved in litigation.84  The court in Deutsche Bank did not apply this 
new test to the facts, as the district court had held that all patent 
prosecution was competitive decision-making, and so the Federal Circuit 
remanded for consideration and analysis.85 
The district court decisions decided after Deutsche Bank provide 
minimal additional guidance as to what level of involvement is 
sufficient.86  One district court held that an individual was engaged in 
competitive decision-making even though he was not directly involved in 
inventive or prosecution activities, because, as the Executive Vice President 
of Intellectual Property (IP) for the party, he did make “strategic decisions 
on the type and scope of patent protection that might be available or 
worth pursuing,” and was the primary architect of the company’s legal 
strategy for IP enforcement.87  On the other hand, another court held that 
merely establishing that the person was involved in IP licensing was 
insufficient where there was no proof that his involvement in licensing rose 
to the level of “competitive decision-making” that created the risk of 
misuse of information.88  Likewise, merely being involved in patent 
litigation settlement negotiations has been found to be insufficient.89 
 
84. See Clayton Corp. v. Momentive Performance, Materials, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-1349 AGF, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68239, at *7, 2013 WL 2099437, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2013) (outlining 
defendant’s assertions of the duties of the counsel in question); AmTab Mfg. Corp. v. SICO Inc., 
No. 11 C 2692, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7307, at *11–12, 2012 WL 195027, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 
2012) (detailing the patent prosecution duties of the counsel in question). 
85.  Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381–82. 
86. Whether district court decisions decided before In re Deutsche Bank are still good law turns 
on comparing each case’s approach to the language in that case—a topic beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
87. Trading Techs., Int’l, Inc. v. GL Consultants, Inc., Nos. 05 C 4120, 05 C 5164, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5876, at *17, 2011 WL 148252, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2011), motion to modify 
denied sub nom., Trading Techs, Int’l, Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43668, 
2011 WL 1547769 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2011). 
88. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765–66 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(emphasizing that, without evidence, the court could not “gauge the risk of inadvertent disclosure of 
confidential information”). 
89. Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. Ihm, No 11-1883 CAB (NLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28152, 
at *5, *8, 2012 WL 684760, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012); AmTab Mfg., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7307, at *11–12, 2012 WL 195027, at *4 (concluding that SICO did not establish that the lawyers 
were sufficiently involved in competitive decision-making to justify modifying the protective order); 
see Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension Semiconductor, Inc., No. 08-158-P-H, 2009 
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C. Step Three: Has the Movant Shown a Nexus Between the Technology in 
 Litigation and the Subject Matter of the Lawyer’s Other Representations? 
Just as a lawyer who is not engaged in competitive decision-making is 
not reasonably likely to inadvertently misuse information, so too a lawyer 
engaged in competitive decision-making but in a distant area of technology 
is also not reasonably likely to misuse information.  Accordingly, courts 
should inquire into whether the technology that the lawyer is prosecuting 
is sufficiently related to the patent-in-suit to create a reasonable likelihood 
that trade secrets or similar confidential business information could be 
misused. 
In this regard, courts also consider whether counsel is involved in 
prosecuting “closely related” applications.90  The ability to misuse 
 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37445, at *29–33, 2009 WL 1210638, at *10–11 (D. Me. Apr. 30, 2009) 
(analyzing whether a trial lawyer’s activities in settling suits was sufficiently analogous to licensing 
activities to justify imposing a bar to access certain information); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., 
No 04-901-JJF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15482, at *8, 2005 WL 1801683, at *2 (D. Del. July 28, 
2005) (construing the attorney’s litigation and licensing involvement as competitive decision-making 
in light of the attorney’s additional role with the company’s management team); Intel Corp. v. VIA 
Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the senior counsel’s interaction 
with company business managers and direct involvement in evaluating licensing agreements amounts 
to competitive decision-making); see also Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C-11-02709 EMC 
(LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23103, at *11–14, 2012 WL 601806, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2012) 
(denying to characterize pre-litigation licensing negotiations as a form of competitive decision-
making). 
90. See, e.g., Cheah IP LLC v. Plaxo, Inc., C-08-4872 PJH (EMC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40823, at *7–9, 2009 WL 1190331, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) (highlighting that the 
plaintiff’s litigation counsel was providing assistance to its litigation counsel in prosecuting patents 
related to the patents-in-suit); see also Methode Elecs., Inc. v. DPH-DAS LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 828, 
832 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (explaining that counsel was “involved . . . in an ongoing patent continuation 
proceeding involving the very patents, the very technology, at issue in this case”), construed by 09-CV-
13078, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154923, 2011 WL 6435308 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2011), report and 
recommendation adopted as modified, 09-CV-13078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60365, 2012 WL 
1559770 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2012); Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Delphi Auto. Sys. LLC, No. 09-
13078, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107137, at *7–9, 2009 WL 3875980, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 
2009) (involving patent prosecution attorneys “currently working on reexamination proceedings at 
the Patent Office concerning the patents at issue in this case”); McDavid Knee Guard, Inc. v. Nike 
USA, Inc., No. 08 CV 6584, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48193, at *7, 2009 WL 1609395, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. June 9, 2009) (emphasizing that the lawyer was “actively involved in current prosecution of 
reissue application” and other related patents); Commissariat a L’Energie Atomique v. Dell 
Computer Corp., No. 03-484-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, at *9-10, 2004 WL 1196965, at 
*3 (D. Del. May 25, 2004) (taking closeness into consideration within the context of LCD 
technology); Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02 C 7008, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23653, 
at *25 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 2003) (highlighting that plaintiff’s counsel was currently prosecuting 
patents on the exact same subject matter as the patents-in-suit); Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres 
Gaming, Inc., CV-S-97-1383-HDM(LRL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22251, at *11, 1998 WL 
1059557, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 1998) (stating the firm “is prosecuting patent applications that are 
not merely related to the patents in suit, they are part of the very core of this suit”); Motorola, Inc. v. 
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information to shape patents is obviously more likely “where there is a 
relationship between the prosecution and the patents-in-suit.”91  On the 
other hand, if the lawyer’s work is not very closely related, bars are 
inappropriate.92 
D. Step Four: Has the Opponent to the Bar Shown that Any Prejudice 
 Caused by the Bar Outweighs Its Benefits? 
Even if a lawyer is subject to a bar because she engages in “competitive 
decision-making,” Deutsche Bank instructed that courts must still balance 
the cost of imposing a bar against the potential harm to the opposing party 
from restrictions imposed on the party’s right to counsel of its choice.93  
In evaluating the potential harm, courts should consider such factors as 
“the extent and duration of counsel’s past history in representing the client 
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the degree of the 
client’s reliance and dependence on that past history, and the potential 
difficulty the client might face if forced to rely on other counsel for the 
pending litigation or engage other counsel to represent it before the 
PTO.”94 
Because the district court did not engage in this analysis, the Deutsche 
Bank case itself provides little guidance.95  Perhaps surprisingly, several 
 
Interdigital Tech. Corp., No. 93-488-LON, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20714, at *14, 1994 WL 
16189689, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1994) (noting that the law firm “is currently prosecuting 
applications relating to the very patents at issue in this litigation”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 121 
F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
91. Northbrook Digital, LLC v. Vendio Serv., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 728, 759–60 (D. Minn. 
2008); see also Kraft Foods Global, Inc. v. Dairilean, Inc., No. 10 C 8006, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
44279, at *12, 2011 WL 1557881, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2011) (denying a bar where no proof 
existed that the lawyer was prosecuting for a competitor); Delphi Auto. Sys., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107137, at *7–9, 2009 WL 3875980, at *4–5 (stressing that the lawyer was involved in prosecuting 
applications at issue in the case); In re Papst Licensing, MDL 1278, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, at 
*8–11, 2000 WL 554219, at *3–4 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (noting that competitive decision-making 
is more likely to be found where the attorneys are advising about patent applications “related to the 
patents-in-suit”). 
92. See Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 574, 579 (W.D. Wash. 
2007), (denying bars because the party moving for the protective order failed to show that the lawyers 
were prosecuting patent applications related to the patent-in-suit); see also Life Techs. Corp. v. 
Biosearch Tech. Inc., No. 2:09-CV-283-TJW-CE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33436, at *6–9, 2011 WL 
1157860, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2011) (permitting access because no risk was shown). 
93. In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
94. Id. at 1381. 
95. See Helferich Patent Licensing LLC v. Suns Legacy Partners LLC, No. CV-11-02304-
PHX-NVW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172422, at *1213, 2012 WL 6049746, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 
2012) (relying on various equitable indicia and practical impacts of the bar to deny a request for bar, 
though without prejudice to seek one later). 
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district courts applying Deutsche Bank have denied bars based upon the 
hardship to the opposing party.96 
IV.     COUNSEL’S OBLIGATIONS IN BARGAINING FOR AND THEN WORKING 
UNDER A PROSECUTION BAR 
A. Counsel Should Make the Bar Clear, Reasonable and Practical to 
 Administer and Monitor 
Because of the uncertain scope of phrases like “competitive decision-
making” and even “patent prosecution,” counsel should draft bars to 
carefully define who is covered, for how long, and the scope of any barred 
activities.  The scope of any protective order is subject to intense 
negotiation and, at times, substantial motion practice, as evidenced by the 
dozens of cases cited in this Article.97  When negotiating and proposing to 
a protective order to the court, counsel should address the following issues. 
1. Scope of Barred Activities 
The scope of activities is a key issue that should be made clear.  With 
respect to subject matter, the difficult issue is to propose language that 
captures the scope of the bar in words that are easy to implement, but 
broad enough to protect legitimate interests of the party producing the 
information.  Given that the courts have some familiarity with the 
 
96. See NeXedge, LLC v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (D. Ariz. 
2011) (concluding that the defendants did not show good cause for a bar because the defendants’ 
concerns did not outweigh the disadvantages to the plaintiff); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BCG 
Partners, Inc., No. 10 C 715, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48337, at *18–27, 2011 WL 1748607, at *6–9 
(N.D. Ill. May 5, 2011) (refusing to disqualify counsel and deny a party its choice of counsel based 
on what may or may not happen in the future); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 758, 
766–67 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (balancing the injury to one party with the need of the other party); Xerox 
Corp. v. Google, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 182, 185–86 (D. Del. 2010) (denying the defendant’s proposed 
reexamination bar for lack of good cause). But see Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts 
Commc’ns., Inc., No. C-09-02180 SBA (DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *14, 2011 WL 
197811, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (applying a prosecution bar to the party’s expert). 
97. See, e.g., Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. Ihm, No. 11-1883 CAB (NLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28152, at *1, 2012 WL 684760, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (granting a joint motion for 
protective order requested by the parties after negotiations over the terms of the order failed); Applied 
Signal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *4–5, 2011 WL 197811, at *1 (arising from a dispute 
regarding the terms of a protective order as part of a patent infringement suit between competing 
satellite communications companies); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 5 C 4120, 
05 CD 5164, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5876, at *3–4, 2011 WL 148252, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 
2011) (resulting from the defendant’s proposal to modify an existing protective order after the parties 
spent what the court characterized as “a massive amount of time and briefing on [the] issues”), motion 
to modify denied sub nom., Trading Techs, Int’l, Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43668, 2011 WL 1547769 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2011). 
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substantial relationship test—a lawyer who receives information is barred 
from competitive decision-making involving technology “substantially 
related” to the patent-in-suit—this may prove as clear as this context 
permits, provide at least some basis for lawyers to judge their conduct, and 
have an anchor in policies underlying protection of confidential 
information.  Yet the phrase “substantially related” is subject to wide-
ranging interpretations.98  However, because the substantial relationship 
test is viewed as adequate to balance the interests of former clients, lawyers, 
and the public, it should be sufficient to balance the interests of opponents, 
lawyers, and the public.  The problem with applying the substantial 
relationship standard does not mean it is not the correct one; it simply 
means that there is an inherent vagueness in the inquiry. 
The geographic scope of the bar may need to be stated.  Typically, a 
prosecution bar should cover not only U.S. filings, but also representations 
involving foreign filings, to the extent that these also present risks of 
competitive decision-making.99  Likewise, whether reexamination 
proceedings, interference proceedings, IPR, licensing, and other forms of 
representation such as handling matters related to abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs) before the FDA and patent acquisition activities 
should be included may also be important considerations.100 
Leaving the scope on this aspect of the bar unclear or unspecified will 
create uncertainty.  Even those district courts that, prior to Deutsche Bank, 
seemed to equate patent prosecution with competitive decision-making 
nonetheless did not automatically include participation in 
 
98. See In re American Airlines, Inc. 972 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring that the 
party moving to disqualify opposing counsel specifically describe the subject matter of prior and 
current representation to establish a substantial relationship); Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 
1100 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Substantiality exists if the factual contexts of the two representations are 
similar or related.” (quoting Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 
1983))); Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating the 
substantial relationship test mandates a showing of patent clarity that the issues involved in the prior 
and current cases are “identical or essentially the same”); Uhlrig v. Harder, No. 93-1009-PFK, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9694, at *12 n.3, 1993 WL 246006, at *5 n.3 (D. Kan. June 3, 1993) (explaining 
one aspect of the split); Moyroud v. Itek Corp., 528 F. Supp. 707, 708–09 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (holding 
two patents not substantially related based on their shared technology field).  
99. Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., No. 00–1473 (MJD/JGL), No. 00-2503 (MJD/JGL), 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22805, at *11, 2001 WL 34784493, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2001) 
(seeking a bar as to domestic and foreign filings), aff'd, No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1758, 2002 WL 171711 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2002). 
100. See Warner Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. 08-6304 (WJM), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 100864, at *15, 2009 WL 3627947, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2009) (analyzing 
reexamination and FDA bar), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451 F. App’x 935 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), reh’g denied (Jan. 31, 2012). 
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reexamination101 in the same category.102  One court explained why, in 
this context, reexamination was different from patent prosecution:  
Claims can only be narrowed during reexamination; they cannot be 
broadened. This is very different from patent prosecution where claim scope 
is being initially determined. Thus, the risk of harm to [defendant] is already 
greatly limited. [Defendant] contends that it is possible that [plaintiff] could 
narrow claims in a manner that captures [defendant’s] products rather than 
in a way that would exclude [defendant’s] products. While this may be true, 
it would be very short sighted for a patentee to intentionally limit claim 
scope to specifically capture one defendant’s products at the expense of 
excluding other would-be infringers’ products. Additionally, purposefully 
doing so would violate the terms of the protective order.103  
Some courts rely on the fact that claims can only be narrowed—or kept 
the same—during reexamination and so there is ostensibly less risk of 
misuse.104  Such courts conclude that it “mitigates the potential to misuse 
PTO procedures to gain a collateral business or litigation advantage, 
thereby rendering a prosecution bar in the reexamination context largely 
unnecessary.”105 
 
101. Inter partes reexaminations were replaced under the AIA by “inter partes review,” but 
reexaminations will continue for many years into the future, as many remain pending. See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 299 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. to 
provide patent reform). 
102. See Phoenix Solutions Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 F.R.D. 568, 580 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (“[S]everal courts have concluded that patent prosecution is, by its very nature, a form of 
competitive decision-making because patent attorneys can control the nature and scope of a patented 
invention.”); In re Papst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litig., No. MDL 1298, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6374, at *8, 2000 WL 554219, at *3 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (reasoning that patent prosecution is 
synonymous with “competitive decision-making”). 
103. Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08CV88, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70092, at 
*5–6, 2009 WL 2461808, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009); see also Document Generation Corp. v. 
Allscripts LLC, No. 6:08-CV-479, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52874, at *9–10, 2009 WL 1766096, at 
*3 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2009) (weighing the merits of the strict protective order against a plaintiff’s 
right to participate in reexamination). 
104. Ameranth, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01810-JLS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20483, at *19, 2012 WL 528248, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012); see also Edisync Sys., LLC v. Adobe 
Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-02231-MSK-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at *6, 2013 WL 561474, 
at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2013) (arguing that a bar was needed because, upon reviewing its 
documents, opposing counsel might “decide not to amend its claims, add new claims, or distinguish 
prior art in strategic ways”). 
105. Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); accord Ameranth, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20483, at *18–19, 2012 WL 528248, at *6 (“The restrictions placed on 
reexamination both underscore the distinction between initial patent prosecution and reexamination, 
and effectively mitigate the potential to misuse PTO procedures.”); see also Unwired Planet LLC v. 
Apple Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00505-RCJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *17–18, 2013 WL 
1501489, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2013) (balancing competing interests to determine the scope of the 
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Even so, circumstances could arise where, for example, a practitioner is 
aware of prior art and confidential future products and is in position to 
carefully craft claims to avoid the former but capture the latter, or to make 
other decisions influenced by confidential information.  The showing to 
justify a bar is high because of the lessened risk of altering the claim’s scope 
to capture an as-yet released product.106  The general possibility that a 
practitioner may not amend claims, add new ones, or strategically address 
the prior art has been found insufficient.107  Thus, although 
reexamination is less likely to implicate the need for a bar, a practitioner’s 
involvement in reexamination can implicate potential misuse of 
information.108  Counsel should carefully assess the facts involved and 
determine whether the bar should reach these proceedings. 
Reissue proceedings, if in the period when broadening reissue is 
permitted, clearly implicate the potential for misuse, and should normally 
be included.109  While the risk for misuse is less when broadening is no 
longer permitted, particular facts may indicate a risk.110  Likewise, a bar 
 
prosecution bar upon reexamination); Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C 11-02284 CW LB, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *20, 2011 WL 6000759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (“The 
scope of prohibited activities is limited to ‘directly or indirectly drafting, amending, advising, or 
otherwise affecting the scope or maintenance of patent claims,’ which is appropriately limited.”); 
Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. Commc’ns, Inc., No. C-09-02180 SBA DMR, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *12, 2011 WL 197811, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (broadening the 
scope of a prosecution bar); Kenexa Brassring Inc. v. Talaeo Corp., No. 07-521-SLR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12002, at *4–5, 2009 WL 393782, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 18, 2009) (contemplating 
granting a full prohibition on reexamination). 
106. See Sanders v. Mosaic Co., No. 09-00016-CV-W-JTM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24584, at 
*10–11, 2012 WL 640159, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 27, 2012) (describing the burden on the party 
moving to bar); NeXedge, LLC v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (D. 
Ariz. 2011) (balancing the requirements for enacting a bar by looking at the risks of disclosure).  
107. Edisync Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at *6, 2013 WL 561474 at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 
13, 2013). 
108. See Sanders, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24584, *15, 2012 WL 640159, at *4 (denying a 
motion to bar litigation); NeXedge, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (denying a bar because of the nature of 
reexamination); Xerox Corp. v. Google, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D. Del. 2010) (applying 
Deutsche Bank to reexamination and finding that the lessened risk of misuse outweighed the need for 
a bar); Crystal Image Tech., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., No. CIV A 08-307, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32972, at *3, 2009 WL 1035017, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2009) (collecting cases that bar 
access to lawyers who are involved in reexamination proceedings), construed by, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48158, 2010 WL 1979298 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48290, 2010 WL 1978760 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2010); Microunity Sys., 
Eng'g., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-00120-TJW, 2005 WL 2299440, at *9 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 
2005) (moving for clarification that the protective order precluded participation in reexamination 
proceedings, but denying that scope of protection). 
109. Ameranth, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20483, at *18, 2012 WL 528248, at *6. 
110. See In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(giving examples of facts that courts should consider when determining risk). 
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may be warranted where a practitioner is participating in appeals or any 
proceeding in which broadening amendments or other potential for misuse 
is a reasonable concern.111 
The adoption of the AIA creates the need for lawyers to examine 
existing protective orders to identify whether “forms” in use need to be 
updated, because it may be unclear whether IPR proceedings are within 
the scope of any bar.  The district court in Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir 
Technologies, Inc.112 addressed that scenario.  It concluded that the parties 
had agreed that IPR was within the scope of their protective order, but 
then turned to the question of whether counsel’s role in IPR would permit 
misuse of any information exchanged in the litigation.113  Noting that the 
parties had failed to provide “few specific facts regarding counsel’s role” in 
the proceeding, it relied upon the fact that during IPR claims may be 
substituted and amended.114  Specifically, the court pointed to 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.121, which provides:  
(a) Motion to amend. A patent owner may file one motion to amend a patent, 
but only after conferring with the Board.  
 (1) Due date.  Unless a due date is provided in a Board order, a motion 
to amend must be filed no later than the filing of a patent owner response.  
 (2) Scope.  A motion to amend may be denied where:    
(i) The amendment does not respond to a ground of unpatentability 
involved in the trial; or    
(ii) The amendment seeks to enlarge the scope of the claims of the 
patent or introduce new subject matter.  
 (3) A reasonable number of substitute claims.  A motion to amend may 
cancel a challenged claim or propose a reasonable number of substitute 
claims.  The presumption is that only one substitute claim would be 
needed to replace each challenged claim, and it may be rebutted by a 
demonstration of need . . . .  
 . . .  
(c) Additional motion to amend.  In addition to the requirements set forth in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, any additional motion to amend may 
not be filed without Board authorization.  An additional motion to amend 
 
111. See Ameranth, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20483, at *10–11, 2012 WL 528248, at *3 
(describing the situations when a bar is necessary). 
112. Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., No. 12-C-483, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70057, 2013 
WL 2138193 (E.D. Wis. May. 17, 2013). 
113. Id. at *9–10, 2013 WL 2138193, at *3. 
114. Id. at *9, 2013 WL 2138193, at *3. 
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may be authorized when there is a good cause showing or a joint request of 
the petitioner and the patent owner to materially advance a settlement.115  
All of this relates to the definition of “prosecution.”  Incorporating into 
the protective order exactly which activities are prohibited and which are 
not is crucial.  For example, some courts hold that the bar only applies to 
lawyers “who actually draft patent applications, claim language for patent 
applications or arguments made in support of patent applications related 
to” the disclosed materials.116  The definition can be critical and it should 
be clear.  For example, in Chan v. Intuit, Inc.,117 the party seeking to bar 
the opposing party from access to information defined patent prosecution, 
or “patenting,” as follows:  
(a) “Patenting” shall mean and include:  
 (i) preparing and/or prosecuting any patent application (or portion 
thereof), whether design or utility, and either in the United States or 
abroad, or participating in a reexamination or reissue proceeding . . . ;  
 (ii) preparing patent claim(s) relating to any of the fields listed above;  
 (iii) providing advice, counsel or suggestion regarding, or in any other 
way influencing, claim scope and/or language, embodiment(s) for claim 
coverage, claim(s) for prosecution, or products or processes for coverage 
by claim(s) relating to the field(s) listed . . . above; and  
 (iv) assisting, supervising, and/or providing counsel to anyone in 
connection with doing any of the foregoing.118  
Finally, as noted above, the prosecuting litigator should determine 
whether the protective order should make an exception for disclosures 
 
115. Id. at *13, 2013 WL 2138193, at *5 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2013)). The court 
went on, however, to engage in equitable balancing and permitted counsel to participate in the IPR, 
subject to “to the extent that neither may amend, substitute, or add claims to either patent during 
that proceeding.”  Id. 
116. Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), No. 00-2503 (MJD/JGL), 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22805, at *15, 2001 WL 34784493, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2001), aff'd, 
No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1758, 2002 WL 171711 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2002). 
117. Chan v. Intuit, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 659 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
118. Id. at 660–61.  The district court rejected the plaintiff’s challenge that paragraph 4(a)(iii) 
was overbroad, but held that Paragraph 4(a)(iv) was “too broad and therefore overly restrictive.”  Id. 
at 662.  Inclusion in a protective order of too broad a definition unnecessarily and perhaps unfairly 
restricts the prosecution activities of the prosecuting litigator, and with little actual, commensurate 
benefit to the opposing party.  See also Andrx Pharm., LLC v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 236 F.R.D. 
583 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (advising with respect to scope of claims constituted competitive decision-
making), aff'd, No. 05-23264CV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58254, 2006 WL 2403942 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 
14, 2006). 
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appropriate under the PTO procedure in the Manual for Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP) Section 724.119  By including such a 
provision, the prosecuting litigator can ensure that the protective order 
permits disclosure to the PTO of material information in a manner that 
preserves the confidentiality of the information. 
The foregoing discussion focused on patent prosecution and how it 
should be defined.  However, confidential information can be misused in 
various ways that counsel may need to include in the scope of barred 
activities.  For example, Apple recently sought to bar opposing counsel 
who advised on patent acquisition strategies from having access to its 
proprietary information, due to the risk that opposing counsel would 
advise their client to acquire patents to assert against Apple.120  Counsel 
should consider whether the licensing activities of a lawyer receiving 
protected information constitutes competitive decision-making and, if so, 
should be included within the protective order for purposes of clarity and 
ease of administration.121 
2. Scope of Personnel Covered by the Bar 
In addition to determining what should be barred, counsel also should 
consider who should be covered.  Normally this can be done by definition: 
any person who engages in the barred activities is precluded from those 
 
119. The public policy in ensuring that material information be disclosed to the PTO should, 
if it can be done in compliance with Section 724, outweigh any need to avoid disclosing information 
to the PTO.  Cf. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(analyzing modification of a protective order to permit disclosure of information in other court 
proceedings). 
120. Unwired Planet LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00505-RCJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52261, at *34, 2013 WL 1501489, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2013). 
121. Parties have sought “licensing” bars in protective orders, whereby recipients of an 
opposing party’s information are prohibited from engaging in license negotiations and related 
activities.  See Barnes and Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C 11-02709, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23103, 
at *17, 2012 WL 601806, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2012) (arguing that access to licensing 
agreements would provide in-house counsel access to confidential information that would otherwise 
be out of reach); Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings PLC, No. C 02-02521-JF, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21400, at *10, 2002 WL 32831822, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2002) (“As with patent 
prosecution, attorneys who both litigate and negotiate licenses for a client may be considered decision 
makers under a U.S. Steel analysis.”), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 
also Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that 
involvement of in-house counsel “in licensing . . . constitutes competitive decision-making”).  See 
generally Louis S. Sorell, In-House Access to Confidential Information Produced During Discovery in 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 657 (1994) (emphasizing that Federal 
Circuit law is the controlling law when drafting and approving protective orders). 
4 HRICIK_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:08 AM 
180 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:150 
activities, or from receiving protected information.122  However, it may be 
that if opposing counsel is not engaged in competitive decision-making 
and is in a very small firm where other lawyers do that work, then their 
conduct should be taken into account in determining whether litigation 
counsel is covered.123 
B. Counsel Should Avoid Potential Conflicts and Liability 
A prosecuting litigator facing the choice of whether to access 
confidential material from an opposing party during litigation should 
consider interests of both the lawyer and the client. For example, the 
lawyer’s own interests could conflict with, or differ from, the client’s 
interests on the question of whether to seek a narrow or broad protective 
order.124 Further, agreeing to work under a prosecution bar means risk for 
the lawyer, since receiving information while prosecuting patents or 
engaging in competitive decision-making creates the risk of inadvertent 
misuse as well as a charge of intentional wrong-doing.125  A lawyer may 
want to avoid facing liability for exposure to confidences, and so will not 
want to oppose entry of a protective order.  Or, the lawyer may not want 
 
122. See Ameranth, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01810-JLS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20483, at *12–13, 2012 WL 528248, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (determining the scope of 
activities that could lead to someone being barred); Crystal Image Tech., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. 
Corp., No. CIV A 08-307, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32972, at *9, 2009 WL 1035017, at *3 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 17, 2009) (“[T]he Court will restrict litigation counsel’s participation in the reexamination 
process to instances in which it is the opposing party who initiates reexamination . . . .”), construed by 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48158, 2010 WL 1979298 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48290, 2010 WL 1978760 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 
2010). 
123. See In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding 
“that the party . . . must show . . . that counsel’s representation . . . does not and is not likely to 
implicate competitive decision-making” in order to proceed); Nazomi Commc’ns, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21400, at *10, 2002 WL 32831822 at *3 (determining that the limited relationship between Nazomi 
Communications, Inc. and its counsel was limited to the extent that there was only a “slight” risk of 
inadvertent disclosure and that the “prospective bar prohibiting Cooley attorneys from prosecuting 
patents on behalf of other clients is not warranted”); Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. C–09–02180 SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *9 2011 WL 197811, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (suggesting that it is more burdensome to hire outside counsel to hire 
new experts). 
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2013) (”[A] lawyer shall not 
represent a client if . . . one client will be directly adverse to another client.”).  See generally Lisa 
Dolak, Risky Business: The Perils of Representing Competitors, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 413 (2002) (analyzing 
Model Rule 1.7 and issues related to patent representations). 
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2013) (explaining the risks of having 
similar, yet competitive, clients).  See generally Lisa Dolak, Risky Business: The Perils of Representing 
Competitors, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 413 (2002) (discussing Model Rule 1.7 and the risks related to patent 
representations of multiple clients). 
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to accept the ban on prosecuting applications because of his obligations to, 
and fees received from, the representation of other prosecution clients.  In 
addition, the client may not appreciate that by having her prosecuting 
counsel litigate the case, she is risking having ownership of later-filed 
applications contested—through assertion of a constructive trust, for 
example—and may not want to face that risk, however slight. 
If a concurrent conflict of interest exists, the lawyer must obtain the 
informed consent of the client after consultation.126  The lawyer should 
fully inform the client of the potential risks and benefits of the proposed 
course of action when necessary.127 
This section discusses the risks—to both clients as well as lawyers—
associated with refusing to accept a prosecution bar, or of remaining a 
prosecuting litigator in a case with a narrow bar in place. 
The short-term benefit of avoiding the bar creates a difficulty for lawyer 
and client.  The client is able to continue to enjoy the benefits of being 
represented by prosecution counsel, who presumably is knowledgeable in 
the technology.  Yet, the short-term benefit may be outweighed by long-
term costs—costs that the client may not recognize and appreciate absent 
consultation with the lawyer.128  The client may not understand that even 
if the lawyer succeeds in obtaining entry of a protective order that does not 
preclude prosecution activities, doing so may place the lawyer, and perhaps 
his client as well, in a worse situation: the lawyer is now in a position of 
being accused of receiving confidential information of an opponent, and 
then turning around and using that information to benefit his client.129  
Furthermore, he must be careful during prosecution to comply with 37 
C.F.R. § 1.56—when disclosing information subject to a protective order 
 
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2013). See generally Lisa Dolak, Risky 
Business: The Perils of Representing Competitors, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 417–18 (2002) (describing 
operation of Model Rule 1.7 in patent representations). 
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2013). See generally Lisa Dolak, Risky 
Business: The Perils of Representing Competitors, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 414 (2002) (“Similarly, clients 
looking for sophisticated trademark and copyright services often seek advice from actioners who 
represent other clients in their particular industries.”). 
128. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)–(4) (stating that even if there is a 
conflict of interest, the lawyer may still represent the client if, among other things, the client gives 
informed consent). See generally Lisa Dolak, Risky Business: The Perils of Representing Competitors, 30 
AIPLA Q.J. 413, 421–22 (2002) (“[E]ven if disciplinary grievance is not filed, or a violation cannot 
be established, representing competitors can give rise to malpractice allegations . . . .”). 
129. See, e.g., Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (detailing a situation where a protective order did not preclude prosecution 
activities); see also Lisa Dolak, Recognizing and Resolving Conflicts of Interest in Intellectual Property 
Matters, 42 IDEA 453, 456 (1999) (discussing that at the very heart of lawyer ethics is the duty to 
past and present clients). 
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to the extent required by that section, but in compliance with PTO 
procedures—and to ensure that his client gives informed consent to his 
continued prosecution in light of the risks and the limitations created by 
access to competitor information.130 
Perhaps the central risk the prosecuting litigator faces is that by gaining 
access to information, he can be accused of having used the information 
for the benefit of his client during prosecution or other competitive 
decision-making representations.131  His client, too, has been placed at 
similar risk because the opposing party can contend that the client received 
the patent only through the lawyer’s use of information exchanged in 
discovery.132  In the context of patent prosecution, misuse of confidential 
information to obtain patents has already resulted in substantial liability.  
Lawyers have been sued for using one client’s information to obtain 
patents for another client.133  These cases arose in the context of firms 
prosecuting applications for multiple clients, and so the lawyers misused 
information gained through the attorney–client relationship, not through 
disclosure during discovery.134  Therefore, this use will violate any 
protective order, either through violation of a general “use only for this 
litigation” clause or through violation of a bar.135  Thus, the potential for 
the same sort of liability exists for prosecuting litigators who acquire 
competitors’ proprietary information while conducting discovery to use for 
the benefit of their clients during prosecution. 
Prosecuting litigators have also been sanctioned for disclosing to the 
PTO information produced by an opposing party during litigation that 
 
130. MPEP § 724.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (“The duty to 
disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim.”). 
131. Cf. Lisa Dolak, Risky Business: The Perils of Representing Competitors, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 
421–22 (2002) (acknowledging the likely dangers attorneys face when dealing with simultaneous 
representation because of potentially subconscious use or misuse of information). 
132. See Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of 
malpractice claim against a law firm based on conversion of patent rights); Am. Stock Exch., LLC v. 
Mopex, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (analyzing a claim for constructive trust 
over patents based on misuse of trade secrets); Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 64 F. Supp. 
2d 233, 235 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing a claim on indefiniteness and counterclaims of 
misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and constructive trust). 
133. Professor Lisa Dolak describes suits in which one client claimed that its lawyers used its 
proprietary information to obtain patents for another client. Lisa Dolak, Recognizing and Resolving 
Conflicts of Interest in Intellectual Property Matters, 42 IDEA 453, 468–71 (1999). 
134. See Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 960 (claiming the attorney converted the client’s interest in a 
patent by giving it to a third party); see also Bausch & Lomb, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46 (discussing the 
defendant’s counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets). 
135. See Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney violated the protective order when he made copies of a 
patent without the consent of the court). 
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was material to a client’s application.  Specifically, in Eagle Comtronics, Inc. 
v. Arrow Communication Laboratories, Inc.,136 lawyers for the defendant 
obtained a patent application from the plaintiff during discovery, which 
they believed disclosed an invention that was actually conceived by one of 
plaintiff’s employees, a former employee of the defendant (Lamb).137  
Even though a protective order in the case precluded using discovery 
materials for any purpose other than the litigation, the lawyers made 
photocopies of the joint application and submitted them to the PTO: one 
part of the application listed only Lamb as the inventor, and the other part 
listed both Lamb and the plaintiff’s employees—one of whom, Gould, was 
also a former employee of the defendant—as co-inventors.138 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had abused 
its discretion in finding the lawyer’s conduct was “not egregious enough to 
warrant an order to show cause” and reversed the district court’s denial of 
sanctions.139  In doing so, the court stated:  
The conduct in this case was indeed egregious and amounted to much more 
than Eagle providing the PTO with material that it already possessed . . . . 
Patent applications are preserved in secrecy by both law . . . and regulation 
. . . for a reason.  The integrity of the patent system is maintained in part by 
inventors’ understanding that their patent applications will remain secret 
until either the patents issue or the applications are otherwise published by 
the PTO.  Breaches of this secrecy undermine the integrity of the patent 
system.140  
Thus, a lawyer who obtains information during discovery that may be 
material to his client’s pending patent applications may not use that 
information for purposes other than the litigation—if the protective order 
so provides.141  Ignoring that obligation can—and in light of the Federal 
Circuit’s finding of an abuse of discretion in Eagle Comtronics, often will—
result in sanctions.142 
 
136. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
137. Id. at 1311. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1312, 1314–15. 
140. Id. at 1314 (citations omitted). 
141. See Damper Design, Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 94-1223, 1995 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3520, at *1, 1995 WL 71339, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 1995) (reversing the trial court's 
decision that prosecuting litigator had violated a protective order by amending certain words in a 
patent application after seeing those words in discovery responses of the opponent because the lawyer 
had previously used those same words). 
142. See Eagle Comtronics, 305 F.3d at 1314 (holding that “the district court abused its 
discretion” when it refused to sanction defendant for unauthorized conduct). 
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Another risk of being exposed to information from an opposing party 
during litigation is the potential for inequitable conduct.  It is clear that a 
lawyer, who as a result of entry of a protective order in a case does not 
learn of material information, cannot be held to have committed 
inequitable conduct by failing later to disclose that information to the 
PTO.143  Suppose, however, that a prosecuting litigator learns 
information through discovery from an opposing party that is material to 
patentability of an application he is prosecuting for a client: this attorney 
would be more likely to face sanctions. 
Inequitable conduct has been found where parties fail to disclose to the 
PTO information gleaned during discovery.144  Eagle Comtronics shows 
that protective orders that contain the common provision restricting the 
use of discovery materials to “this action” do not contemplate disclosure to 
the PTO.145 
Given that a practitioner who receives information subject to a 
protective order may not disclose it to the PTO without violating the 
protective order, does the presence of the protective order provide 
justification for nondisclosure to the PTO?  If not, then may a lawyer 
withdraw from prosecution without disclosing the information? 
The absence of well-developed authority on that issue provides another 
reason for prosecuting litigators to avoid exposure to discovery materials.  
It was only in May 2004 that the PTO adopted revisions to the MPEP to 
provide a limited procedural path through this dilemma.146  Specifically, 
the MPEP permits practitioners, under certain circumstances, to disclose 
information that is subject to a protective order to the PTO under seal.147  
The provision was added in light of the recognition that “[s]ituations arise 
in which it becomes necessary, or desirable, for parties to proceedings in 
the Patent and Trademark Office relating to pending patent applications 
 
143. See Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 638, 676–77 (D. Del. 
2004) (finding that a protective order entered in a prior case had shielded persons involved in 
prosecuting an application from learning of certain information, and therefore no inequitable 
conduct existed in their failure not to disclose that information), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other 
grounds, remanded 406 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
144. See, e.g., ICU Med., Inc. v. B. Braun Med. Inc., No. C 01-3202 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 40710, at *2–3, *48, 2005 WL 588341, at *1, *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2005) (denying 
motion for summary judgment because the failure to disclose information gained through discovery 
to PTO raises the genuine issue of inequitable conduct). 
145. Eagle Comtronics, 305 F.3d at 1311, 1314.  
146. See generally Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Previous Editions and Revisions, U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Sept. 28, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
pac/mpep/ (listing previous editions and revision history of the MPEP). 
147. MPEP § 724.01(8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). 
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or reexamination proceedings to submit to the Office trade secret, 
proprietary, and/or protective order materials.”148  However, the MPEP 
gives practitioners authority to submit materials under seal only in limited 
circumstances, and specifically excludes doing so with respect to 
information “submitted in amendments, arguments in favor of 
patentability, or affidavits under 37 C.F.R. [§] 1.131 or [§] 1.132.”149 
Despite its limitations, this new PTO procedure provides a key—even if 
partial—means to reduce controversies for prosecuting litigators.  
Prosecuting litigators should ensure that any applicable protective order 
specifies that information may be disclosed to the PTO when it may be 
done so in accordance with the applicable MPEP sections.150  Including 
such a provision is important because protective orders that limit use of 
information to “this action” may be construed not to permit disclosure to 
the PTO.151  Thus, even if the procedure under MPEP Section 724 is 
available, a lawyer who is subject to a protective order precluding any use 
other than for “this action” may not be able to take advantage of the 
MPEP procedure because doing so would violate the protective order.152 
No doubt various other fact patterns and combinations of activities can 
create other problems.  Lawyers attempting to combine roles should ensure 
that they thoroughly analyze the various roles of the actors involved. 
V.     POLICIES AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS THE JUDICIARY SHOULD 
CONSIDER IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE MOVANT HAS SHOWN 
GOOD CAUSE FOR A PROPOSED BAR, OR ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
OUTWEIGHS ITS BENEFITS 
A. Courts Should Consider Practical and Policy Issues When Determining 
 Whether to Impose a Bar and When Assessing Its Subject Matter and 
 Temporal Breadth 
 
148. Id. § 724. 
149. Id. § 724.03. See generally Reminder of the Proper Procedure for Filing Confidential 
Information, Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office Notice (May 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2004/week20/patinfo.htm (discussing MPEP 
§ 724.02). 
150. See Reminder of the Proper Procedure for Filing Confidential Information, Off. Gaz. Pat. & 
Trademark Office Notice (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/ 
og/2004/week20/patinfo.htm (reiterating the proper procedure when filing patent applications). 
151. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
152. Id. (concluding that the protective order was violated because it plainly stated that the 
marked items “shall not be used for any purpose other than for this action”). 
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The terms of the protective order on each of these issues can 
dramatically affect not just the client but the lawyer as well.  For example, 
many patent practitioners develop expertise in narrow technologies,153 
and thus a ban as to all clients in a “field” or “subject matter”—if broadly 
defined—could cost the lawyer significant revenue.  Likewise, a client who 
relies on such a practitioner for prosecution and loses the lawyer’s service 
because of entry of a protective order will face substantial costs in 
educating another lawyer on the technology and applications.154 
The increasing frequency at which parties are disputing the need for or 
scope of protective orders suggests two possibilities: first, lawyers are 
seeking to be in a position to misuse information—a dubious proposition, 
but a possibility—or, second, those seeking prosecution bars are 
attempting to obtain protections that are too broad, in effect turning a 
motion for a protective order into a motion to disqualify counsel.155  
Courts need to approach prosecution bars with care, as they have grave 
potential for misuse and abuse.  Thus, careful analysis, rather than 
categorization, is the key.  Many factors should inform the judicial 
decision on whether patent representations involve competitive decision-
making and, if so, to what extent to impose a bar.  All of these factors 
should be evaluated, not in light of regional circuit law, but under the 
control of Federal Circuit law.156 
The starting point to judicial analysis should be the utility of bars.  
Courts often rely on two basic rationales: first, patent prosecutors can 
misuse information to shape pending applications or, second, patent 
prosecutors can use such information to impact future product design.157  
 
153. The lawyer in In re Sibia, for example, prosecuted applications for fifty clients in the same 
general field. In re Sibia Neurosciences, Inc., No. 525, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 31828, at *2 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct. 22, 1997). 
154. For this reason, protective orders should allow barred counsel time to educate replacement 
prosecution counsel. It may be useful, for example, for a litigator to delay having access to the highly 
confidential information in order to use that time to educate counsel who will take over responsibility 
for prosecuting applications. 
155. See Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(explaining that disqualification of counsel should be imposed only when absolutely necessary); see 
also AmTab Mfg. Corp. v. SICO, Inc., No. 11 C 2692, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7307, at *6, 2012 
WL 195027, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2012) (dispelling SICO’s claims as vague and speculative). 
156. In re Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing David Hricik, How 
Things Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and Liability Risks Arising From Representing a Single 
Client in Multiple Patent-Related Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 442 (2005)). 
157. Id. at 1381 (“[I]nformation related to new inventions and technology under development, 
especially those that are not already the subject of pending patent applications, may pose a heightened 
risk of inadvertent disclosure by counsel involved in prosecution-related competitive [decision-
making] . . . .”); In re Papst Licensing, GmbH, Patent Litig., MDL 1278, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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Some examples of the former include the prosecuting litigator who could 
theoretically use information disclosed during discovery to draft claims in 
pending or new applications to cover products that the opposing party 
intends to bring to market.158  Another example would be the risk that a 
litigator who sees draft patent applications of the other party will, as a 
prosecutor, “be better able to ‘write around’ [the disclosing party’s] patents 
when drafting [his client’s] own patent applications.”159 
With respect to the first rationale, many courts’ explanations as to why 
litigators should be denied access to certain discovery materials might 
justify denying access to putative inventors—since they clearly are in a 
position to take information disclosed by an opposing party during 
litigation, and then apply for a patent derived from that information.160  
However, litigators prosecuting applications cannot “invent” subject 
matter, and cannot—except in unusual circumstances—even be named as 
inventors along with their clients on patent applications that they are 
prosecuting.161  Inventors have a “spark of genius” and file for patents on 
their inventions.  In contrast, patent attorneys prosecute patent 
applications.  They are usually not inventors, and, as noted, generally 
 
6374, at *14, 2000 WL 554219, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (holding that such restrictions only 
apply to “information that embodies product design information which is classifiable as confidential 
and which is of the type that can be included in a patent application . . .”). 
158. Papst Licensing, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, at *12, 2000 WL 554219, at *4 (“Counsel’s 
ability to file new claims in existing and pending patents based on the confidential information 
discovered during the course of this litigation poses an unacceptable opportunity for inadvertent 
disclosure and misuse.”). 
159. Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL), No. 00-2503 (MJD/JGL), 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22805, at *12, 2001 WL 34784493, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2001), aff'd, 
No. 00-1473 (MJD/JGL) 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1758, 2002 WL 171711 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2002); see Andrx Pharm., LLC v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 236 F.R.D. 583, 587 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 
(relying on similar notions to preclude adding outside counsel who prosecuted applications to 
protective order), aff'd, No. 05-23264CV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58254, 2006 WL 2403942 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 14, 2006). 
160. See, e.g., Andrx Pharm., 236 F.R.D. at 586 (discussing various court opinions regarding 
the risk of inadvertent disclosure); Chan v. Intuit, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 659, 662 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(“[T]he Court must consider whether counsel might inadvertently use confidential information 
obtained in the course of this litigation to shape advice . . . to the detriment of the opposing 
party . . . [i]f so, then such counsel should either be denied access to confidential information or be 
precluded from patenting for a party.”). 
161. See Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“An 
attorney’s professional responsibility is to assist his or her client in defining her invention to obtain, if 
possible, a valid patent with maximum coverage. An attorney performing that role should not be a 
competitor of the client, asserting inventorship as a result of representing his client.”). 
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cannot be inventors along with their clients.162  The risk can be real, but 
it must be kept in context. 
With respect to the rationale that a lawyer could use information to 
affect product design, an example would be the lawyer’s use of this sort of 
information, not for patent prosecution, but for advising a client on 
formulating business decisions, product design, or financial planning.  
While the facts of a particular case may show that this is a reasonable 
possibility, few patent prosecutors are, by reason of prosecuting patents, 
involved in product design.  Further, product design requires skill sets not 
commonly taught in law school. 
In some circumstances, such as in drafting freedom-to-operate opinions, 
a lawyer could be in a position to advise a client not to launch a particular 
product because the lawyer knows the scope of a pending application; 
however, those circumstances are fact-specific.163  Again, the risk can be 
real, but it must be kept in context.  These cases also do not necessarily 
arise because the lawyer is a patent prosecutor, but rather because of the 
lawyer’s other activities beyond prosecution. 
Intertwined with the question of whether a bar is warranted is its scope.  
Courts must ensure that bars protect the legitimate interests of parties in 
litigation who disclose their most valued commercial plans.  However, 
there are countervailing concerns: a bar that is too broad denies a client his 
choice of counsel, denies lawyers a means to earn a living, and also denies 
other clients the right to choose that lawyer to represent them in future 
matters.164 
Although only one court has currently recognized it, two somewhat 
related bodies of ethical principles help inform this analysis.165  The first 
 
162. See id. (holding that an attorney’s professional responsibility precludes such attorney from 
asserting inventorship). 
163. See LightGuard Sys., Inc. v. Spot Devices, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 593, 599 (D. Nev. 2012) 
(deciding that documents related to freedom-to-operate protocol were not barred from disclosure); In 
re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., MDL No. 2354, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157352, at *18, 2012 WL 
5398858, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2012) (recognizing facts relevant to a patent attorney’s decision-
making role including “filing patent paperwork and providing broad oversight of patent prosecution, 
or . . . making strategic decisions on patent prosecutions and portfolios . . . ”). 
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 cmt. 1 (2013) (“An agreement restricting 
the right of lawyers to practice . . . not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the 
freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”); see also In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., F.3d 1373, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the court must consider “the potential harm to the opposing 
party from restrictions imposed on that party’s right to have the benefit of counsel of its choice.”). 
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2013) (outlining the circumstances in 
which an attorney is limited in his ability to represent future clients due to conflicts of interest with 
former clients); Id. R. 5.6 (2013) (stating that lawyers should not engage in agreements that require 
them to forego future representation). 
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is the protections that are afforded by the ethical rules to former clients; 
the second, the limitations within the ethical rules on the ability of lawyers 
to agree to forego future representations. 
The ethical rules protect former clients,166 and so it would be odd if 
courts gave greater protection to opposing parties in litigation than the 
ethical rules require that lawyers give to their former clients.  Generally, 
lawyers are permitted to take representation that is adverse to a former 
client so long as the matter against the former client is not “substantially 
related” to the work the lawyer previously did for the client.167  Courts in 
the patent context tend to take a very narrow view of what constitutes a 
“substantial relationship,” and generally permit lawyers to take 
representation adverse to former clients, so long as the case against the 
client does not involve a substantially identical patent to the one the lawyer 
worked on for the former client.168  Thus, there ought to be a 
presumption that a bar that covers more than prosecution of patents that 
are substantially identical to the patents-in-suit is overly broad.169 
The ethical rules also protect future clients and lawyers by preventing 
lawyers from entering into agreements that unnecessarily impinge upon 
the right of future clients to retain a lawyer.170  Although these rules vary 
 
166. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381 (“[T]he court should consider such things as the 
extent and duration of counsel’s past history in representing the client before the PTO, the degree of 
the client’s reliance and dependence on that past history, and the potential difficulty the client might 
face if forced to rely on other counsel for the pending litigation or engage other counsel to represent 
it before the PTO.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2013) (listing the duties owed to 
former clients). 
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2013) (“A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related mater in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interest of the 
former client . . .”); Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2013) (acknowledging that the passage of time may render 
obsolete information acquired in a previous representation). 
168. See David Hricik, PATENT ETHICS: LITIGATION, 48–55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) 
(collecting cases from the PTO and federal courts that apply the substantial relationship test to patent 
practice). 
169. Cf. Methode Elecs., Inc. v. DPH-DAS LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (issuing a bar only as to subject matter related to that which was disclosed or claimed in 
patents-in-suit), construed by, 2011 WL 6435308 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2011), report and 
recommendation adopted as modified, 09-CV-13078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60365, 2012 WL 
1559770 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2012); Crystal Image Tech., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., No. CIV 
A 08-307, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32972, at *8, 2009 WL 1035017, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2009) 
(“Should anyone other than Defendant seek reexamination of the [patent-in-suit], the justifications 
for allowing trial counsel to participate are substantially undermined.”), construed by, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48158, 2010 WL 1979298 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48290, 2010 WL 1978760 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2010).   
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 cmt. 1 (2013) (explaining that lawyers 
may not make agreements restricting the right to practice because “it limits the freedom of clients to 
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by state, many states’ ethical rules prevent lawyers from entering into an 
agreement that restricts the lawyer’s right to practice law.171  Generally, 
these rules are interpreted to prohibit lawyers from agreeing to forego 
representing clients adverse to former clients in substantially related 
matters.172  Thus, a protective order that contains a prosecution bar that 
exceeds the scope of protection afforded to former clients would appear to 
implicate these rules, since that bar would restrict the attorney’s right of 
practice.173  This again suggests that any prosecution bar should be 
limited in scope to prosecution and other activities that involve technology 
that is at least substantially related to any patent in suit.  Some courts 
recognize this principle, and narrowly impose bars.174 
This policy framework to determine whether to impose a bar and on 
what subject matter can also assist in determining its temporal aspects.175  
For example, in the context of protecting former clients, courts recognize 
that information becomes stale over time, and so whether a representation 
adverse to a former client is “substantially related” can turn in part on 
whether the information the lawyer likely gained while representing the 
client is of any utility in the adverse matter.176  In patent practice, 
sometimes information becomes stale quite quickly, depending on the 
technology involved.  Thus, the same body of law that influences whether 
 
choose a lawyer”); CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1-500 (2013) (applying the Model Rule in a state 
setting). 
171. See, e.g., CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1-500 (2013) (detailing California’s approach, which 
is substantially similar to the ABA Model Rules). Other states have rules that are limited to 
agreements entered into in settling disputes, but they may have case law that expands the prohibition 
to any agreement. 
172. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2013) (limiting lawyers’ conduct in 
terms of former clients); Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2013) (defining how matters substantially relate to one 
another). 
173. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2013) (demarcating lawyers’ conduct in 
relation to past representation of a client); Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2013) (defining how matters 
substantially relate to one another). 
174. See Warner Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100864, 
at *9, 2009 WL 3627947, at *2 (D. N.J. Oct. 29, 2009) (rejecting a broad bar); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Actavis Elizabeth, LLC, No. 07-3770 (DMC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53816, at *9, 2008 WL 
2783345, at *3 (D. N.J. July 15, 2008) (denying a broad bar), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 435 Fed. 
App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011); AFP Advanced Food Prods. v. Snyder’s of Hanover Mfg., No. Civ.A. 
05-3006, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 426, at *3, 2006 WL 47374, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) 
(rejecting a bar as to prosecuting applications relating to “low protein containing products . . . 
including . . . cheese dips”). 
175. See generally Cheah IP LLC v. Plaxo, Inc., C-08-4872 PJH (EMC), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4082, at *3, 2009 WL 1190331, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) (analyzing competing 
proposals as to length of the bar). 
176. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9, cmt. 3 (2013) (explaining that 
information becomes obsolete over time). 
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a former client’s information is stale ought to inform the analysis of how 
long a bar should last. 
The scope of the subject matter and the time for which any bar lasts are 
most clearly implicated by these two bodies of law.  Yet, rather than 
analyzing the real world facts, courts are categorically imposing time 
frames that may have some rational relationship to patent prosecution, in 
the abstract, but not to particular fields of technology or the actual facts 
before them.177  As a general approach, courts apply a one- or two-year 
bar;178 however, in several cases, the bar ran neither from the date of 
disclosure of the information nor from any judgment, but from the 
exhaustion of any appeals.179  Because of the one-year bar in the Patent 
Act,180 the disclosing party should have to bear a substantial burden for 
imposition of a bar of longer than one year from the date of disclosure of 
the information.181  While it may be that the date can begin to run when 
the lawyer reviews the information, at least one court found that system to 
be unworkable and thus relied upon the end of litigation.182  While 
administrative convenience is a factor, other bright lines—such as the end 
 
177. See, e.g., Edisync Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-02231-MSK-MEH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at *9, 2013 WL 561474, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2013) (holding that any 
prosecuting attorney would be barred for two years following the conclusion of the trial); Motorola 
Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., No. 93-488-LON, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20714, at *19, 1994 WL 
16189689, at *7 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1994) (barring any attorney who had previously received 
confidential information from Motorola from prosecuting them for at least one year after the case at 
bar), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 121 F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
178. Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 03–484–KAJ, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, at *8, *10, 2004 WL 1196965, at *2–3 (D. Del. May 25, 2004) (imposing 
a one-year sanction); see also Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C 11–01548 CW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *8–10, 2011 WL 6000759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (analyzing the 
scope at length). 
179. Kelora Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *20, 2011 WL 6000759, at *7 (applying a 
two-year bar); Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. Commc’ns, Inc., No. C–09–02180 
SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *9, 2011 WL 197811, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) 
(implementing a two-year bar); Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, at 
*7, 2004 WL 1196965, at *2 (employing a one-year bar, including appeals); Interactive Coupon 
Mktg. Group, Inc. v. H.O.T.! Coupons, LLC, No. 98 C 7408, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9004, at *11, 
1999 WL 409990, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1999) (instituting a ban for “one year after the conclusion 
of this litigation, including appeals”), modified, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12437, at *11, 1999 WL 
618969, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1999). 
180. See Conditions for Patentability; Novelty and Loss of Right to Patent, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(b) (Supp. V 2011) (conditioning the issuance of patent on an application being filed within 
one year after the claimed invention is first sold or offered for sale in the United States). 
181. See Edisync Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044, at *4, *8, 2013 WL 561474, at *1, *3 
(“As the party seeking to expand the scope and duration of the prosecution bar, Defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating good cause for the additional restrictions”). 
182. Id. at *8, 2013 WL 561474, at *3. 
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of the discovery period—may also be workable and avoid the potential for 
a bar lasting years beyond any period in which information could be of 
use.183 
The substantive breadth of the bar also implicates these two policies. 
There are several factors to consider when determining how broad a 
prosecution bar parties should negotiate or a court should impose.184 
First, the court and parties must consider whether it can and should cover 
either only inventions in the exact same subject matter, or any prosecution 
for the client.185  A request for a bar that is broader than for the same or 
substantially related subject matter should be viewed carefully.186 
The scope of the bar manifests itself in ways beyond time and subject 
matter.  Foremost, courts must consider whether the bar prevents the 
lawyer from representing only the client that the lawyer is representing in 
the lawsuit, or whether the bar prohibits that lawyer from representing any 
client within the scope of the technological definition from competitive 
decision-making.187  If the practitioner represents multiple clients in the 
 
183. But see id. (reasoning that a bright-line start date would avoid disputes over when an 
attorney had last seen information). 
184. See In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (asserting 
that the court should engage in a balancing analysis, weighing the risk of inadvertent disclosure 
against the potential injury to the opposing party as a result of the prosecution bar). 
185. This issue was central to Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 
03–484KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, 2004 WL 1196965 (D. Del. May 25, 2004). There, the 
court rejected a narrow bar:  
I will not pick and choose which categories of LCD technology are fair game for CEA's patent 
prosecution attorneys and which are not. If CEA's patent prosecution attorneys have access to 
the Defendant's highly confidential information, they will be barred from prosecuting patents 
“relating to the broad subject matter of the patents in suit, that is, LCD technology.  
Id. at *10, 2004 WL 1196965, at *3; see also Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C 11–01548 
CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *18–23, 2011 WL 6000759, at *6– 8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 
2011) (analyzing the scope at length). 
186. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381; see also Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. C–09–02180 SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at *8, *11–12, 2011 WL 
197811, at *2, *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (emphasizing that the proposed bar on subject matter 
must be balanced with the risk presented by the disclosure of the confidential information). 
187. See Kelora Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *9–10, 2011 WL 6000759, at *3 
(analyzing whether counsel was involved in competitive decision-making for clients other than the 
parties to the litigation); Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings PLC, No. C 02-02521-JF, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21400, at *6–7, 2002 WL 32831822, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2002) (describing 
how the patentee argued that the bar should include all clients that the lawyer is representing in the 
technology area), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Motorola, Inc. v. 
Interdigital Tech. Corp., No. 93-488-LON, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20714, at *18, 1994 WL 
16189689, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1994) (detailing how the court prohibited prosecution only for 
the client involved in the litigation, ITC, and not for any other clients), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
121 F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  Interestingly, the Motorola court presumed that the ethical duty to 
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same narrow field of technology, then a broad bar may seem appropriate.  
However, the obvious consequence of a broad bar would be a severe 
economic impact on the practitioner.  Clearly, a court should weigh the 
parties’ competing concerns in determining whether the bar should 
prohibit prosecution for any client other than the one that the lawyer is 
representing in the current litigation. 
Only by careful analysis can courts properly balance the legitimate 
interests of parties seeking prosecution bars against those of the public, the 
opposing lawyer’s present and future clients, and the lawyers.188  Doing so 
prevents litigants from using protective orders to gain unfair and 
inappropriate litigation advantages, essentially using motions for protective 
orders as thinly disguised motions to disqualify counsel, in order to further 
not only their clients’ interests in confidentiality, but to obtain an 
unwarranted edge in litigation that harms not just the opposing party, but 
opposing counsel and the public. 
B. Courts Should Account for the Practical Realities When Determining 
 Whether Prejudice Outweighs Any Harm 
Balancing requires care.  Obviously, the cost to replace counsel, either in 
litigation or in prosecution, matters greatly.  Courts also should consider 
the role the prosecuting attorney plays in the representation of the client.  
Some companies, for example, do much of patent drafting in-house, 
relying on outside patent counsel less than others.  In this analysis, the 
relationship between the litigants in the commercial marketplace is a 
factor.189  While courts hold that direct competition is not required, 
misuse of confidences is less likely where there is no realistic economic or 
practical incentive to do so.190  District courts after Deutsche Bank have 
noted that where a non-practicing patent acquisition entity is seeking to 
 
its client, ITC, would prevent the firm “from prosecuting patent applications for other clients that are 
of similar subject matter as ITC's patents in this case.” Id. at *18 n.5, 1994 WL 16189689, at *6 n.5. 
188. See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension Semiconductor, Inc., No. 08-
158-P-H, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37445, at *34–35, 2009 WL 1210638, at *11 (D. Me. Apr. 30, 
2009) (balancing various competing interests). 
189. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., No. 6:06 
CV 549, No. 6:06 CV 550, No. 6:06 CV 551, No. 6:06 CV 324, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13675, at 
*19, 2009 WL 440608 , at*2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009) (premising the decision on the “adversarial” 
relationship of the parties in the marketplace). 
190. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378 (explaining that direct competition is one of many 
factors use to determine whether a party has economic incentive); NeXedge, LLC v. Freescale 
Semiconductor, Inc. 820 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (D. Ariz. 2011) (stating that the movant must 
show that opposing counsel be involved in competitive decision-making if the movant wants 
opposing counsel to be barred from the information). 
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impose a bar, the consequences of a bar are lessened; this is no doubt true, 
if the entity does not develop products or apply for patents, but only 
acquire patents from others.191  Clearly, some representations raise the 
likelihood of misuse of information more than others.  Courts should 
consider the particular facts with care. 
VI.     COUNSEL’S OBLIGATIONS TO ENSURE EVERY LAWYER RECEIVING 
BARRED INFORMATION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE BAR 
As shown above, whether a bar covers a particular person turns on that 
person’s actual representations, not categories or labels.  In most situations, 
only the party subject to the bar will know those facts; therefore, only they 
will know whether someone subject to the bar should not receive 
confidential information or should refrain from a particular representation. 
For these reasons, counsel for the party receiving information subject to 
a protective order should ensure that he analyze the activities of every 
lawyer, and other persons subject to the bar, who will have access to 
disclosures subject to a bar.  If the bar is clear as to what is included, and 
what is not, this should be relatively easy.  Where the bar is less clear—for 
example, in a worst case scenario where the bar precludes a person 
receiving barred information from engaging in competitive decision-
making until that information is “generally known”—the need for 
monitoring becomes more difficult, but also more necessary. 
Counsel should consider whether other participants in the litigation 
might need to be subject to a bar, including the opposing party if he is an 
inventor.192  For example, lawyers should consider whether the opposing 
party’s experts are in a position to be subject to a prosecution bar.  If an 
expert is engaged in competitive decision-making, the Deutsche Bank 
analysis may warrant a bar or denial of access to information.193  
 
191. NeXedge, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (denying a bar). 
192. See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc., No. 10 C 715, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48337, at *23–24, 2011 WL 1748607, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2011) (discussing issues that 
may arise when a member of the opposition is an inventor). 
193. See RyMed Techs., Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., No. 3:10–1067, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57209, at *8, 2013 WL 1279209, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (refusing to apply a bar to all experts); 
Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc., No. 3:12–MC–00131–SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158349, at *1-2, 
2012 WL 5399970, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2012) (analyzing an expert who had pending patent 
applications); Applied Signal Tech., Inc. v. Emerging Mkts. Commc’ns, Inc., No. C–09–02180 SBA 
(DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97403, at*14–16 ,2011 WL 197811 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) 
(relying on Deutsche Bank to hold that it is the plaintiff’s burden to show than an expert should be 
exempt on an individual basis); Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C 11–02284 CW (LB), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96724, at *22, 2011 WL 6000759, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug 29, 2011) (“[I]n Deutsche 
Bank the Federal Circuit indicated that ‘investigating prior art relating to those inventions’ likely 
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Consultants, too, may need to be monitored for their work not only on the 
case in litigation, but also for other clients.194  Furthermore, there is a 
realistic possibility that a bar, either expressly or by implication, will be 
imputed to other lawyers in a small firm, particularly where a partner in 
the firm had a business interest in the patentee.195  The need to protect 
confidential information from disclosure to prosecuting attorneys has been 
addressed even where the prosecuting attorneys are in separate firms from 
those litigating the case.196 
This may require analysis or monitoring of the activities of non-lawyer 
client principals.  For example, several courts have analyzed whether a non-
lawyer officer of a competitive corporation should be barred.197  In some 
circumstances, such as where an officer was actively involved in pursuing 
patents in a closely related area of technology, a bar was granted.198  
 
constituted competitive decision-making.”); Iams Co. v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., No. C-3-97-449, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19205, at *8–9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1998) (addressing access by an expert witness 
who was involved in product development). 
194. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 12 C 3609, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 91408, at *10–11, 2013 WL 3287133, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2013) (comparing 
consultants with expert witnesses). 
195. This is not an ethical conflict where imputation under Model Rule 1.10 or similar state 
rules would apply since, by definition, those rules impute conflicts relating to clients, and the 
opposing party to a protective order is not a client of the prosecuting litigator.  In re Dell, 498 F. 
App’x 40, 42–43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (describing but not deciding the issue).  Further, as shown here, 
the question of whether to impose a prosecution bar is made on a lawyer-by-lawyer basis. Imputation 
would eviscerate that requirement.  Although imputation is improper, the facts could warrant barring 
other lawyers in a barred lawyer’s firm from prosecuting patents.  For example, the risk of accidental 
misuse might arise in a very small firm where other lawyers prosecute in highly specialized, closely 
related technologies. 
196. See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 (Court of Int'l Trade 
2004) (granting a protective order requiring that an ethical screen be established between the firm 
representing party in litigation and another firm which prosecuted patents for that party). 
197. See, e.g., Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control Inc., 682 F. Supp. 20, 
23 (D. Del. 1988) (precluding the plaintiff's president from examining documents belonging to 
defendant). 
198. The leading case is Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control Inc., 682 F. 
Supp. 20 (D. Del. 1988).  See Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 725, 742–43 
(Fed. Cl. 2013) (applying a balancing test to bar a president of an opposing corporation); Tailored 
Lighting, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania Prods., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 146, 149 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding 
that a company's president should not have access to certain confidential information provided by the 
patentee in part because it would be “unreasonable to expect that anyone working to further his own 
scientific and technological interests would be able assuredly to avoid even the subconscious use of 
confidential information revealed through discovery that is relevant to those interests”); see also 
Northbrook Digital, LLC v. Vendio Servs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 728, 735, 743 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(concluding that a corporation’s owner, who was also an attorney, could not have access to 
proprietary information under the protective order because his “activities [related to] prosecuting 
continuation applications related to the patents in suit [were] not compatible with allowing him to 
review, either as an attorney or as an expert witness, [defendant's] confidential technical 
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Counsel needs to ensure that people subject to the bar having access to 
barred information understand the limitations on their activities, especially 
where the recipient is a non-lawyer. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
Prosecution bars present numerous issues for courts and counsel. It may 
be that because of prosecution counsel’s knowledge of the technology that 
her service as trial counsel would lead to cost savings and other benefits to 
her client.  However, due to the myriad of problems that arise from having 
litigation counsel also engage in other activities, she may be wrong for the 
part.  Only through careful analysis by the courts of the policies involved 
and through careful drafting of any protective orders can courts, clients, 























information”); cf. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01–2373–GV, U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27981, at *14–15, 2002 WL 33003691, at *3–4 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2002) (distinguishing 
Safe Flight and allowing defendant inventor to examine confidential technical information because he 
did not initiate the lawsuit and should be allowed to defend himself, he had previously served as an 
expert witness for plaintiff and had access to its other confidential information, and he was not in 
direct competition with plaintiff). 
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